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PIRACY AND DUE PROCESS
Andrew Kent *

Introduction
A skiff piloted across the Indian Ocean at night by Somalia pirates mistakenly attacked a U.S. naval vessel, and the hapless pirates were soon in
1
U.S. government custody. Did the Constitution require that they receive
Miranda warnings before being questioned, or other protections that implement constitutional due process? Or are constitutional protections inapplicable for some reason—because of the context, territorial location, or nonU.S. citizenship?
Questions like this arise frequently. In addition to international piracy
prosecutions, recent cases include Due Process and Fourth Amendment
claims by the parents of a Mexican teenager killed in Mexico by a U.S. bor2
der patrol agent shooting from the U.S. side of the border; a Due Process
and Fourth Amendment challenge to the drone killing in Yemen of a U.S.
3
citizen leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; a series of habeas corpus, Due Process, and other challenges to detention, treatment, and military
commission trials of noncitizens designated as enemy combatants and held
4
at the U.S. navy base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and Fifth Amendment
challenges to interrogation by U.S. law enforcement officials of foreign na5
tionals held by Kenyan authorities.

*
Professor, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Christopher Borgen, Nathan Chapman,
Thomas Lee, Ethan Leib, and Peggy McGuinness for helpful comments on earlier versions of
this article, and to John Langbein and Gregory Durston for expert consultation. This article
benefitted from presentation at the International Law Colloquium at St. John’s Law School.
1.
See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 470–75, 473 & n.19 (4th Cir. 2012).
2.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
3.
Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 71–74 (D.D.C. 2014).
4.
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (evaluating a habeas Suspension Clause challenge to a statute stripping jurisdiction over habeas claims); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (analyzing statutory and separation of powers challenges to
military commission); Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (evaluating an
Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to military commission); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (analyzing a damages suit against the Secretary of Defense and others concerning
military detention and alleged mistreatment).
5.
In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 103–05, 108,
115 (2d Cir. 2008). For other examples, see Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (examining habeas challenges to detention of noncitizen enemy combatants by the U.S.
military at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378
F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (evaluating a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim by a Sudanese corporation hit by a cruise missile fired in retaliation for Al Qaeda’s bombing of U.S.
embassies in Africa).
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Extraterritorial U.S. government action tends to involve national security and foreign affairs considerations and often is directed at non-U.S. persons. These cases thus raise sensitive issues about both the legal limits on
the national security and foreign affairs powers of the U.S. government and
the role of the judiciary versus the political branches in articulating and enforcing those limits. The cases also raise the question of whether U.S. citizenship, or lack of it, should be a primary consideration in defining the lim6
its of U.S. government power when deployed abroad.
Since the mid-twentieth century, U.S. Supreme Court case law and
government practice have coalesced around the view that U.S. citizens carry
7
their constitutional rights with them globally. But with regard to noncitizens, the law and practice are very different. The Supreme Court did not
start opining on this issue until the latter part of the nineteenth century, but
once it did, the Court repeatedly stated that noncitizens abroad were outside
8
the protection of the Constitution.
Before the late nineteenth century, direct statements about whether nonU.S. citizens possessed constitutional rights extraterritorially were few. Still,
9
they pointed the same way—against extraterritorial rights for noncitizens.
But the lack of evidence of direct discussions of the issue during the Founding and antebellum periods, combined with the fact that most rights-bearing
10
provisions of the Constitution are, by their text, not limited to citizens, led
some judges, scholars, and litigants to make originalist arguments in favor
of viewing constitutional rights as operative abroad to protect noncitizens.
Thus Louis Henkin, the leading foreign relations scholar of the second half

6.
Some other countries’ legal systems are confronting the same type of questions. See
Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 81–108 (2011) (documenting debates about legal extraterritoriality in Canada and the United Kingdom).
7.
See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? 25 (2009); J.
Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J.
463, 474–75, 478 & n.86 (2007) [hereinafter Kent, Global Constitution]; Andrew Kent, Citizenship and Protection, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2115, 2120–21 (2014) [hereinafter Kent, Citizenship].
8.
See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268–75 (1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771, 784 (1950); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
332 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 724 (1893).
9.
See, e.g., Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 399 (1863); 33 ANNALS OF
CONG. 693, 1042 (1819) (providing statements of Rep. Henry Baldwin and Rep. Alexander
Smyth); REPORT OF VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES REGARDING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
ACTS (1800), reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 303, 320–21 (David. B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991). On the meaning of this Virginia report, authored by James Madison, see
Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 530–31. During the late 1790s, a time of conflict
with France, there were frequent statements by Federalists that no noncitizen, whether in the
United States or abroad, possessed constitutional rights. See id. at 529–30 (collecting sources).
10.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people . . . .”); id. amend. V
(“No person shall be held . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions . . . .”).
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of the twentieth century, asserted that the Founders intended the Bill of
11
Rights to be a “universal human rights ideology.” Henkin’s view was ac12
cepted by some other scholars and by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
But these kinds of originalist arguments fail to persuade most scholars
and judges. When the Court in Boumediene v. Bush extended the Constitution to noncitizens at a U.S. military base in foreign territory—protecting
noncitizens outside the United States for the first time—it did not rely on
13
originalist arguments, finding them inconclusive. Likewise, scholarship
has rebutted originalist arguments in favor of extraterritorial constitutional
rights for noncitizens. As I explained elsewhere, the best textual and
originalist reading of the Constitution is that relations with foreign nations
and noncitizens abroad would be conducted pursuant to international law,
sub-constitutional domestic law (e.g., statutes and common law), and di14
plomacy, rather than via extraterritorial application of the Constitution.
15
A new article, Due Process Abroad by Professor Nathan Chapman,
seeks to defend an originalist view of a global Constitution for noncitizens
through a focus on the law governing English and then early American responses to piracy. Chapman’s vision of global due process for all has both
great territorial reach and great power. First, he claims that the Due Process
Clause was intended and understood by the founding generation to be glob16
al, benefitting both citizens and noncitizens “anywhere in the world.” Due
process, according to Chapman, meant that, outside of the context of “war,”
the U.S. government could not deprive any person, anywhere, of life, liberty, or property except according to standing law, including the Constitution,

11.
LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 99–
100 (1990); see also Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 32 (1985).
12.
See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 701–02 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Jordan J. Paust, Boumediene and
Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Power, 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 354–55 (2009);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective
in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 8 (2003); Jules Lobel, The Constitution
Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 871, 875–76 (1989).
Other scholars have made more specific claims, for instance that the habeas corpus right
embodied in the Constitution’s Suspension Clause was originally understood to protect
noncitizens abroad. See Brief for Professors of Constitutional Law and Federal Jurisdiction as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5–25, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No.
06-1195).
13.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746.
14.
Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7; Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black
Holes and Converging Domains: Changing Individual Rights Protection in National Security
and Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1036–37 (2015) [hereinafter Kent, Black
Holes].
15.
Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process Abroad, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 377 (2017).
16.
Id. at 377.
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its jury rights, and other applicable law. Although Chapman never makes
clear how to distinguish “war” from other uses of force, he maintains that
there was such a well-understood line in English and early American law.
Where due process applied, Chapman asserts that use of the jury was “the
18
sine qua non of traditional due process.”
Second, Chapman appears to claim that this global Due Process Clause
was understood to be a substantive limit on the way the U.S. government
could respond to perceived threats. According to Chapman, anyone, anywhere who was “suspected” of engaging in conduct which violated U.S.
civil or criminal laws could “only” be proceeded against by the U.S. gov19
ernment via judicial due process. Since U.S. statutes have always criminalized violent group-based misconduct that might in theory demand a military
response—for instance, treason and piracy since 1790, international slave
trading since 1808, and, today, the use of a weapon of mass destruction and
20
provision of material support to terrorist organizations —Chapman’s version of global due process would severely restrict the range of policy re21
sponses that the U.S. government could pursue.
17.
Id. at 377, 381.
18.
Id. at 381.
19.
Id. (“To comply with due process, the federal government could deprive someone
of rights only in compliance with the Constitution, statutes, treaties, court procedures, and
general law, including the common law and the law of nations.”); id. at 389 (“[T]he historical
evidence strongly suggests that Americans understood all those suspected of violating U.S.
law—anywhere—to be entitled to due process of law before the government could deprive
them of ‘life, liberty, or property.’”); id. at 405 (“Due process required the ordinary constitutional, statutory, and common law criminal procedures before the punishment of any suspect
captured outside U.S. territory.”).
20.
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14 (treason and piracy); Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (international slave trade); 18 U.S.C. § 2332a
(2012) (use of weapon of mass destruction); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012) (material
support to terrorist organizations).
21.
But in post-publication communications with me, Chapman describes his article as
claiming, instead, that the government did have the option of pursuing militarily as enemies,
without due process, persons who engaged in conduct contrary to domestic law, rather than
always treating them as suspected criminals with due process. In this version, due process
does not limit the choice of means by the government, but merely requires that, once the
means of law enforcement have been chosen, due process procedures are mandatory, even if
the government is acting abroad against noncitizens. By the seventeenth century in England,
as also in colonial and early American law, due process required the use of the traditionallyapplicable common law procedures such as the jury in a legal proceeding at which life, liberty, or property were at issue, held in a properly constituted tribunal, and charging a violation
of a known offense. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 97–98,
472–73 (4th ed. 2002); JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1664–1776, at 385 (1970);
Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121
YALE L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012). Under this definition, little if any government conduct implicating due process would actually take place against pirates abroad or on the high seas; the relevant state action would occur rather in English or American territory, once the suspected pirate, apprehended extraterritorially, was brought there and proceeded against judicially.
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Chapman grounds his claims about the U.S. Constitution in an extended
discussion of English law, which concludes that England also viewed due
process as global and as imposing a substantive restraint in favor of a criminal justice approach to piracy suppression starting in the sixteenth century.
Due Process Abroad, and its originalist view of global constitutional22
ism, is already receiving favorable attention from some legal scholars and
23
litigants. Many legal scholars have long had sympathy for arguments in
24
favor of constitutional rights extending globally to noncitizens, even as
originalist arguments to that effect have seemed weakly-sourced. A critical
examination of the evidence presented in his new article would seem useful
at this time. Perhaps the recent academic coalescence around the view that
the Constitution was not understood to provide extraterritorial protections
during the founding era and early Republic, at least with regard to nonciti25
zens, needs to be re-examined.
A focus on piracy is both apt and timely. Piracy took place primarily on
the high seas, therefore inherently raising questions about extraterritorial
application of fundamental rights. Citizens and subjects of many nations engaged in piracy, and frequently intermingled as crew, thus raising questions

Chapman seems to concede this. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 15, at 382 (“Federal officers
who captured suspects on the high seas, in foreign territorial waters, and even on foreign soil
transported them back to the United States, where those suspects received the same due process protections as any other federal defendant.”); id. at 382–83 (stating that a federal official
who punished a suspected pirate extrajudicially on the high seas would be “personally liable
in a damages action for marine trespass”—not, apparently, found to have violated the Due
Process Clause). Yet it is entirely uncontroversial that persons charged with domestic crimes
and tried in England or America were entitled to due process there, no matter their citizenship
or where apprehended. See, e.g., Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 505, 516, 518–
21; Kent, Citizenship, supra note 7, at 2118–19. So, if this is all Chapman is saying, one wonders why this uncontroversial thesis would be presented as “challeng[ing]” a supposedly contrary “consensus.” Chapman, supra note 15, at 377. It certainly feels odd to disagree with an
author about what his paper says, but still I choose to address the bolder, substantive reading
of Due Process Abroad, outlined in my main text above, rather than the minimal and uncontroversial thesis described in this footnote because I find the former more faithful to his written text.
22.
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at 7, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Ilya Somin, Does The
Constitution Require Due Process Abroad?, JOTWELL (July 12, 2017), https://
conlaw.jotwell.com/does-the-constitution-require-due-process-abroad/ (last visited Oct. 4,
2018).
23.
Reply Brief of FBME Bank Ltd. and FBME Ltd. at 17, FBME Ltd. v. Mnuchin,
709 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 17-5076), 2017 WL 3215091, at *17 (citing the article
favorably).
24.
See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 469.
25.
See, e.g., RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 38; GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO
THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1996); Kent, Black Holes, supra note 14, at 1036–39; see also Chapman, supra note 15, at 380 (“[S]cholars seem to uniformly agree that early American history
supports the notion that due process stopped—especially for aliens—at the nation’s borders.”). See generally Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7.
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about the extent to which legal protection turned on nationality. And piracy
was a phenomenon that blurred lines between war and crime, leading government piracy suppression operations to contain elements of both war
fighting and law enforcement. It is thus an important test case for Founding
era views about the reach of fundamental constitutional rights to places, persons, and contexts beyond the paradigm case of the Constitution’s applicability—governance of U.S. citizens in the United States.
The study of piracy and piracy suppression in this article and Chapman’s is part of a growing body of work on those subjects by legal scholars
and historians. Recent historical work elevated piracy and piracy suppression to important places in debates about the drivers of central state for26
27
mation in Europe, the motives for English colonization of the new world,
28
the aims of European great power politics during the early modern era, and
29
the legal delimitation of the oceans. Legal scholars focused on the role of
30
piracy in the development of concepts of international torts and crimes,
31
international jurisdiction including universal jurisdiction, and the international law cases of the U.S. federal courts sitting in their admiralty and
32
maritime jurisdiction. With the re-emergence of piracy as a live threat, especially off the east coast of Africa and in the waters around Indonesia and

26.
See, e.g., MIKKEL THORUP, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF TERROR: WAR,
VIOLENCE, AND THE STATE (2010); JANICE E. THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND
SOVEREIGNS: STATE-BUILDING AND EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE (1994).
27.
See MARK G. HANNA, PIRATE NESTS AND THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1570–
1740 (2015).
28.
See, e.g., CARL BRIDENBAUGH & ROBERTA BRIDENBAUGH, NO PEACE BEYOND
THE LINE: THE ENGLISH IN THE CARIBBEAN 1624–1690 (1972).
29.
See, e.g., Lauren Benton, Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean
Regionalism, 47 COMP. STUD. SOC. & HIST. 700 (2005).
30.
See, e.g., Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 198
(2010); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals
About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004).
31.
See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place
in International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 47–49 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004); Joseph M. Isanga, Countering Persistent Contemporary Sea Piracy: Expanding
Jurisdictional Regimes, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1267 (2010); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy
Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 184
(2004) [hereinafter Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy].
32.
See, e.g., Joel H. Samuels, How Piracy Has Shaped the Relationship Between
American Law and International Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (2010); William R. Casto, The
Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1993); G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International
Law: The Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 727 (1989).
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33

Malaysia, legal scholarship has also focused on modern rules and institu34
tions of domestic and international law of piracy suppression.
This article explores in depth the law of nations, English domestic law,
and English government practice from the late medieval period through the
eighteenth century, and the U.S. constitutional law and government practice
during the Founding and antebellum periods. I conclude that Chapman’s
claims about due process and piracy suppression are incorrect. Both Parliament and the U.S. Congress; both the Crown and its counselors and U.S
Presidents and their advisers; both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy; and
commentators both English and American believed that (1) pirates on the
high seas could lawfully be subject to extrajudicial killing, but that (2) the
criminal justice system was usually the preferred approach to dealing with
pirates, and when tried for their crimes in English or American territory respectively, accused pirates were entitled to due process of law.
This article proceeds in five main parts. Section II discusses the law and
government practice of England from the 1500s to 1800. Theorists of the
emerging law of nations taught that pirates were unprotected by the law and
could be slaughtered wherever found. English domestic law adopted this
view, and the Royal Navy and colonial forces carried it out. This section
disputes Chapman’s reading of two anti-piracy statutes from the time of
Henry VIII, showing that they did not instantiate a global vision of due process. It also questions Chapman’s claim that a statute from William III’s
reign that allowed jury-less criminal trials of pirates was viewed as problematic or illegal. Section III explains why, despite the lawfulness of military force against pirates, under the law of nations and domestic law, the
English government nevertheless preferred a law enforcement approach to
piracy. Section IV turns to the post-independence law of the United States.
It continued the English tradition, under which law enforcement was the
first option, but military force was viewed as a lawful tool as well. The final
part, Section V, addresses the problem of drawing lines between contexts in
which only law enforcement methods may be used and those in which military force is also lawful. A brief Conclusion offers some thoughts about the
persistence of originalist arguments for a global Constitution, despite the
lack of evidence to support them.

33.
IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS., https://www.iccccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
34.
See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of
Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243 (2010); James Kraska & Brian Wilson, The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Coalition Is the Strategy, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 243
(2009); Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory
for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2007).
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I. The Law of England
English law and practice are crucial to Due Process Abroad because the
article claims that the new United States embodied in its Constitution a due
process framework inherited from its mother country. Anglo-American fundamental law, according to Chapman, prohibited the government from using
any means other than law enforcement and due process to confront any person, anywhere, whose conduct violated, or was suspected of violating, a
criminal statute. The strong weight of the evidence refutes these claims.
Due Process Abroad presents a truncated version of the history of criminal process in England. According to Chapman, English fundamental law
dating back to the medieval period required that no free person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property except according to the ordinary course of
35
the common law. He notes that common lawyers identified this principle
with the “law of the land” clause of Magna Carta (1215) and the “due process” requirements of statutes dating from the fourteenth-century reign of
36
King Edward III. According to Chapman, “the sine qua non of traditional
37
due process” was trial by jury. He asserts that this understanding of due
process “set sail”—i.e., came to cover all persons within its ambit of protection, even pirates found on the high seas—in two landmark statutes of Hen38
ry VIII (1535 and 1536). These acts ordained that piracies and other
crimes committed on the high seas should be tried according to the common
law, with grand jury indictment and jury trial. Due Process Abroad reads
them to be examples of a more general principle that the government was
limited to common law procedures whenever it confronted any person, anywhere, who was suspected of engaging in conduct made civilly or criminally wrongful by statute or common law. The article portrays as an unfortunate deviation—which was reviled and quickly corrected by Americans
after their revolution—a statute, enacted at the end of the seventeenth century during the reign of William III, which authorized trial of pirates captured
on the high seas or in the English colonies in ad hoc admiralty courts sitting
without a jury.
There are many problems with this account, both in its particulars and
in its conclusion. First, the particulars: In the time before the American
Revolution, English law never required that life, liberty, and property only
be taken away through common law procedures. There were always courts
that heard criminal cases under non-common law procedures, though these
generally did not impose the death penalty. It did come to be considered an
important part of traditional English liberty that capital cases—and piracy
was a capital crime—be heard only according to common law procedure.
But this was not the motivation for the statutes of Henry VIII. Those statutes
35.
36.
37.
38.

See Chapman, supra note 15, at 381, 393–94.
See id. at 393–94.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 392–94.
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were expressly intended to make it easier to convict and hang pirates. As for
the statute of William III, Due Process Abroad assumes that it must have
been widely seen as unlawful, but presents no evidence of this.
And, on the overall conclusion, it is clear that English law and policy
approved the extrajudicial killing of pirates encountered on the high seas.
There was no global due process for pirates. This English view emerged out
of many intellectual sources, including writings on the law of nature and the
law of nations. It was also driven by the practical reason that the oceans
were vast, transport and communications slow, and the protective resources
of the state minimal—meaning that self-help and summary violence were
perceived to be necessary tools.

A. The Legal Status of Pirates under the Emerging Law of Nations
By the seventeenth century, a consensus emerged among jurists and
theorists of the law of nations that pirates were outside the protection of the
law and could be lawfully killed by anyone, whether government or private
actors.
Several centuries earlier, up through the early Renaissance period, piracy was not a legal term, and acts of piracy were not seen as necessarily ille39
gal on the international plane. Individual polities applied their domestic
law to combat robberies and violence at sea. For instance, starting in the late
1200s, surviving records show English civil court proceedings seeking
40
compensation for acts of robbing and pillaging at sea. Starting in the mid1300s, there are records of English common law criminal proceedings for
41
acts that would later be called piracy. In the same period, diplomatic records show the English crown negotiating to pay compensation to foreign
42
merchants who had been victimized by English sea raiders.
Emerging out of both Christian scholastic and humanistic intellectual
traditions during the Renaissance, writers in the 1500s began developing
theories of lawful international behavior that eventually became a largely
secular “law of nations”—what would later be called international law.
These early theorists almost uniformly condemned piracy as illegal, viewed
the lives and property of pirates as unprotected by law, and authorized the
use of unrestrained violence against them. Pierino Belli (1502–75), a military commander and then councilor of state for the Duke of Savoy, wrote of
pirates in his treatise De Re Militari et Bello Tractatus that “it should be
permissible for anyone to attack them . . . even persons in private life may

39.
See THOMAS K. HEEBØLL-HOLM, PORTS, PIRACY AND MARITIME WAR: PIRACY IN
THE ENGLISH CHANNEL AND THE ATLANTIC, C. 1280–C. 1330, at 13 (John Hudson ed., 2013).
40.
See Reginald G. Marsden, Introduction to 1 SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF
ADMIRALTY, at xi, xvii–xxxiv (Reginald G. Marsden ed., 1894).
41.
GREGORY DURSTON, THE ADMIRALTY SESSIONS, 1536–1834: MARITIME CRIME
AND THE SILVER OAR 4 (2017).
42.
Id.; Marsden, supra note 40, at xvii–xxxv.
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assault such outlaws—and to the point of killing them.” Balthazar Ayala
(1548–84), an influential jurist from the Spanish Netherlands, taught that
44
pirates cannot receive any protection from the laws of war. Jean Bodin
(1530–96), an important French law professor, politician, and political theorist, taught that pirates and brigands were not “just and lawful enemies” and
45
so are “excluded from all the benefit of the law of Armes.”
One of the most influential figures in conceptualizing a secular law of
nations and defining rules regarding piracy s Alberico Gentili (1552–1608),
a Protestant refugee from an Italian state who settled in England and served
more than two decades as the Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford University. Gentili wrote that the law of nations and its subpart, the laws of war,
apply to conflicts between organized sovereign states, but not to conflicts
46
with or between private individuals or groups. By definition, a lawful
47
“state of war cannot exist with pirates and robbers.” “Neither brigands not
pirates are entitled to the privileges of international law, since they themselves have utterly spurned all intercourse with their fellowmen and, so far
as in them lies, endeavor to drag the world back to the savagery of primitive
48
times.” “With pirates and brigands, who violate all laws, no laws remain in
49
force.” “[N]o rights will be due to these men who have broken all human
50
and divine laws . . . .”
According to Gentili, the lack of any protection of the law for pirates
meant that unlimited violence could lawfully be used to suppress them. In
general, private war—organized violence not carried on by a sovereign
51
state—was illegal and could “be punished with death[.]” This was even
more so with pirates. Quoting Cicero, Gentili referred to pirates as “the
52
common enemies of all mankind . . . .” “It is right to make war upon pi53
rates . . . .” Gentili then states that all nations may participate in “the slaying of pirates[,]” for they are “common enemies, and they are attacked with

43.
PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO TRACTATUS (1563), quoted in Harry D.
Gould, Cicero’s Ghost: Rethinking the Social Construction of Piracy, in MARITIME PIRACY
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 30 (Michael J. Struett et al. eds.,
2012).
44.
Id. at 31.
45.
JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE 1 (Kenneth Douglas McRae
ed., Richard Knolles trans., 1962) (1606).
46.
See 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 15, 20, 25 (John C. Rolfe
trans., 1933) (1612) [hereinafter GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI]; see id.
47.
Id. at 22.
.
48
ALBERICO GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES 79 (Gordon J. Laing trans.,
photo. reprint 1924) (1594).
49.
GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 46, at 24.
50.
Id. at 124.
51.
Id. at 20 (quoting Plato).
52.
Id. at 22.
53.
Id. at 124.
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impunity by all, because they are without the pale of the law.” “They
ought to be crushed[,]” and states should “everywhere . . . shatter the lairs of
55
pirates.” Gentili even compared pirates to dangerous beasts: “To pirates
and wild beasts no territory offer safety. Pirates are the enemies of all men
and are attacked by all men with impunity, etc. Similarly the hunting of wild
56
57
beasts is unrestricted.” In sum, pirates may be “put to death . . . .”
Along with Gentili, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) is recognized as the other major founder of international law. Grotius used the
concept of the state of nature and an analogy between individuals and states
to inform his work on standards of international behavior. Individuals in the
state of nature, prior to government and thus prior to any sovereign-created
law, had certain rights and duties to each other according to the law of nature. These core rights included self-defense and the right to punish wrongdoers with violence. Just as man had a natural right to kill “a Serpent,”
“Foxes; and noxious Reptiles,” and other “Beasts . . . [which] do, or attempt
to do, us hurt,” so also could he kill “a Robber, or a Thief,” or other “Male58
factor.” Grotius—and later, John Locke—taught that, when humans entered into social relations and created governments, the natural right of self59
defense and punishment was partially transferred to the sovereign. But on
the international plane, there was no sovereign who stood above states. Grotius therefore theorized states to stand in relation to each other as did individuals in the state of nature: possessed of no common sovereign, and accordingly allowed to deploy their natural right to use lethal force in self60
defense.
According to Grotius, sovereigns possessed the right to use violence to
protect and prevent injuries to their subjects and polities and also to punish
persons, groups, or states which did not directly injure them but committed
“grievous Violations of the Law of Nature of Nations,” including cannibals
and “those who practice piracy” and therefore are “cut . . . off from human
61
Society.” Thus, any sovereign could lawfully make war against pirates
(and, as noted, private individuals could use violent self-help against pirates

54.
Id. at 423.
55.
Id. at 423–24.
56.
2 ALBERICO GENTILI, HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS LIBRI DUO 18 (Frank Frost Abbott trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1921) (1613).
57.
GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 46, at 22.
58.
2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 973–74 (Richard Tuck ed.,
Jean Barbeyrac trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625).
59.
Id. at 1021–24; see also RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 81–82
(1999) (discussing the parallel development of this concept in the thought of Grotius and
Locke).
60.
See TUCK, supra note 59, at 8–9, 95–96, 129, 140, 186, 188; J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations,
85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 887–88 (2007).
61.
GROTIUS, supra note 58, at 1021–24.
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on the high seas). “[T]he justest War is that which is undertaken against
wild rapacious Beasts, and next to it is that against Men who are like
62
Beasts.” On the high seas, where no sovereign ruled, private persons, as
well as governments, continued to have a natural right to use violent self63
help against those who would injure them. Thus private individuals could
also lawfully slay pirates.
The core teachings of Gentili, Grotius, and others on the right to destroy
pirates were carried forward through the centuries. This idea was often encapsulated in the Ciceronian phrase hostis humani generis—that pirates
64
were the common enemies of all mankind. This concept had a secondary
meaning as well, applicable in domestic judicial systems. One example is in
the work of the famed English jurist Edward Coke (1552–1634), who served
as Solicitor General of England, Attorney General of England, Chief Justice
of the Common Pleas, and then Chief Justice of the King’s Bench. When
65
Coke discussed pirates’ status as “hostis humani generis,” he meant the
war against all nations and laws waged by pirates, and their locus on the
high seas where all nations had a common right of self-defense, allowed any
state to exercise jurisdiction to punish a captured pirate in its domestic legal
system, no matter the nationality of the offender or the nationality of the
66
victims.
These two related meanings of hostis humani generis were accepted by
English legal authorities. By the seventeenth century, writers on internation67
al law agreed that “pirates were considered to be an evil to be eradicated.”
For instance, Richard Zouche (1590–1661), who, like Gentili, held the Regius chair in Civil Law at Oxford, and also served as judge of England’s
High Court of Admiralty, wrote in a 1650 treatise that “the laws of war do
not apply” to “pirates” and “brigands,” and so it is “lawful to offend and de68
stroy [them] utterly.” Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Attorney General and

62.
Id. at 1024.
63.
Id. at 970 (“Yet the ancient Liberty, which the Law of Nature at first gave us, remains still in Force where there are no Courts of Justice, as upon the Sea.”).
64.
This term was first used by Roman authors to describe tyrants like Nero and Commodus, and later during the Dark Ages by Christian theologians to describe the devil. See
DAN EDELSTEIN, THE TERROR OF NATURAL RIGHT: REPUBLICANISM, THE CULT OF NATURE,
AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 30–34 (2009).
65.
EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
113 (London, M. Flesher 1644).
66.
See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 165–66 (2009); Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy, supra note 31, at 190–92.
67.
HEEBØLL-HOLM, supra note 39, at 13. See also Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy,
supra note 31, at 190 (“The law of nations also permitted any nation that caught a pirate to
summarily execute him at sea.”).
.
68
2 RICHARD ZOUCHE, AN EXPOSITION OF FECIAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, OR OF
LAW BETWEEN NATIONS, AND QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SAME 37–38 (Thomas Erskine
Holland ed., J.L. Brierly trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1911) (1650).
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Lord High Chancellor of England under James I, wrote that “[i]t was never
doubted but a war upon pirates may be lawfully made by any nation, though
not infested or violated by them[,]” because “pirates are communes humani
69
generis hostes[.]” Bacon also approved of preventive war against any
states that engaged in piracy: “Beasts are not less savage because they have
70
dens.”
Charles Molloy (1640–1690), a barrister whose popular treatise on international maritime law went through at least ten editions, summed up the
conventional wisdom of centuries of writers on the law of nations by holding that “[a]gainst Pirates and such as live by Robbery at Sea, any Prince
71
hath power to make War,” in other words, to use military force. Molloy
continued that anyone who captures pirates on the ocean, including private
persons, “may execute such Beasts of Prey immediately, without any So72
lemnity of Condemnation.” And according to Molloy, if captors did bring
pirates to port to stand trial, but “the Judge openly rejects the Tryal, or the
Captors cannot wait for the Judge without certain peril and loss,” the pirates
73
may, by the “Law of Nature,” be “executed by the Captors.”
Matthew Tindal (1657–1733), a philosopher and influential Admiralty
lawyer, agreed with the consensus that pirates and others who engage in
private, non-state sanctioned violence have “no Right by the Law of Nations
74
to be treated as [a lawful] Enemy,” but rather may be “put[ ]. . . to Death.”
In the eighteenth century, William Blackstone (1723–80), member of
Parliament and then Justice of King’s Bench and Common Pleas, summarized in his magisterial treatise the view of pirates taken by natural law and
law of nations theorists. He wrote that pirates have reduced themselves “to
the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind,” and so “all
mankind must declare war against him: so that every community hath a
right, by the rule of self-defence, to inflict that punishment upon him, which
every individual would in a state of nature have been otherwise entitled to
75
do.” As discussed above, in the state of nature, the putative state of humankind prior to social organization and government, people were said to
have a natural liberty to use lethal force in self-defense and as a deterrent to

69.
FRANCIS BACON, ADVERTISEMENT TOUCHING A HOLY WAR (1622), reprinted in 1
THE WORKS OF LORD BACON 521, 528 (London, Henry G. Bohn 1854).
70.
Id.
71.
CHARLES MOLLOY, DE JURE MARITIMO ET NAVALI: OR, A TREATISE OF AFFAIRES
MARITIME, AND OF COMMERCE 55 (7th ed., London, John Walthoe, Jr., 1722).
72.
Id. at 61.
73.
Id.
74.
MAT[THEW] TINDALL, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE LAWS OF NATIONS AND THE
RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS 20, 24–25 (London, Richard Baldwin, 1694).
75.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *71.
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others. John Locke, in expounding the right of every person in the state of
nature “to kill a murderer,” taught that those who “hath, by unjust violence
and slaughter . . . declared war against all mankind, [may] therefore be de77
stroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild beasts.” Since international
relations between states, and relations between individuals on the high seas,
were also said to occur in a state of nature, Blackstone was referencing the
well-established view that governments and private individuals could lawfully kill pirates, the enemies of all mankind, and outside the protection of
the law.

B. English Domestic Law on Piracy
Although the law of nations was quite clear that pirates could be targeted with military force or summarily executed upon capture, English domestic law, in theory, might have limited or abolished that rule with respect to
the conduct of the English government and private English actors. In other
words, domestic law might have provided pirates with an entitlement to be
treated as an accused criminal subject to due process rather than an unlawful
combatant or wild beast subject to summary violence. This, in effect, is
Chapman’s argument, though he ignores the voluminous evidence (summarized above) about the legality of summary violence against pirates under
78
the law of nations.
Chapman reads a passage in Blackstone to state that suspected pirates
had the right to be proceeded against only by due process and the law of the
land, no matter their nationality and no matter where they were seized. Here
is the relevant passage in Blackstone:
Formerly [piracy] was only cognizable by the admiralty courts,
which proceed by the rules of the civil law. But it being inconsistent with the liberties of the nation that any man’s life should be
taken away, unless by the judgment of his peers or the common law
of the land, the statute 28 Hen. 8 c. 15 established a new jurisdiction for this purpose, which proceeds according to the course of the
79
common law . . . .

76.
See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 6–11 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g 1980) (1690); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183–91 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1651).
77.
LOCKE, supra note 76, § 11.
78.
Chapman does not discuss the work of Grotius, Gentili, Zouche, Molloy, or other
influential theorists who wrote that pirates are unprotected by the law of nations and could
lawfully be killed.
79.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 394 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 75).
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According to Chapman, Blackstone meant that “the Acts of 1535 and
1536 effectively extended Magna Carta’s ‘law of the land’ protection to
80
those accused of crimes on the high seas. Due process had set sail.”
It is uncontroversial that pirates present in England and charged with a
domestic law crime would be entitled to protection of the courts and law,
including due process of law. But, as noted above, Chapman appears to be
making two stronger claims. First, he asserts that due process always required full common law procedural protections, including the jury. Second,
he views the English anti-piracy statutes as evidencing a supposed rule that
the government could not address suspected piracy—even on the high seas
and when committed by non-Englishmen—with anything other than law enforcement methods following all of the usual procedural protections of the
common law. The evidence for these claims is lacking. My discussion is divided into two subparts. First, I show that the two statutes from Henry
VIII’s time had a very different purpose and meaning than what Chapman
claims. Second, I show that “due process” in English law was never understood to require that all criminal proceedings proceed under full common
law procedures.

1. Understanding the Statutes of 1535 and 1536
Two anti-piracy statutes enacted by Henry VIII and Parliament in 1535
and 1536 did not extend “due process abroad” to pirates—or anyone else—
on the high seas or in foreign lands. The statutes were enacted to strip away
procedural protections that had made it too difficult to convict pirates and
other malefactors. There is no evidence that they were intended or understood to grant global due process to suspected pirates.
Before the two Henrican statutes, English admiralty courts trying piracies proceeded according to the course of the civil law, using a Roman81
canon law criminal procedure in which judges served as fact-finders. The
civil law character of these proceedings, with judges serving in inquisitorial
and fact-finding roles, in addition to determining the law, can be seen on the
face of commissions issued concerning piracy. For example, a 1531 commission from Henry VIII appointed Arthur Viscount Lisle, the vice-admiral
of England, and several other men, including a civilian (“John Fewter,
LL.D.”) “as justices to make inquisitions concerning pirates and piracies,
82
and to hear and determine all such cases.”
80.
Id. at 393–94.
81.
DURSTON, supra note 41, at 8; 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 546, 550 (3d ed. 1922). This dated at least from Edward III’s Statute of Treasons. See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 75. On the earlier history of criminal trials for piracy in England,
see DURSTON, supra note 41, at 7–8; Marsden, supra note 40, at xxxvi.
82.
5 LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, OF THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII
14 (James Gairdner ed., London, HM’s Stationery Office 1885) (entry 35). A “civilian” is a
lawyer trained in the civil law. On the training and practice of English civilians, see Charles S.
Cumming, The English High Court of Admiralty, 17 TUL. MARITIME L.J. 209, 226–29 (1993).
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The preambles to the statutes of 1535 and 1536 state that pirates, robbers, murderers, and others who committed crimes upon the high seas
“many tymes escape unpunysshed [unpunished]” because the proceedings
occurred under the civil law, which requires before the judgment of death be
imposed that “either they [the accused] must playnly confess their offences
(which they will never doo without torture or paynes),” or there must be testimony from indifferent witnesses who saw the offence committed, which is
very difficult to acquire because the crimes occur on the seas and perpetra83
tors “many tymes murder or kill” any possible witnesses.
The problem was that the civil law had very high standards of proof
compared to the common law, as the statutes recite. An English common
law jury could “convict on whatever evidence persuaded it,” including sole84
ly circumstantial evidence. In the common law system, now-canonical
rules and practices like the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and judicial
review of the sufficiency of evidence were centuries in the future. After the
85
Fourth Lateran Council ended trial by ordeal in 1215, the civil law moved
in a very different direction than the English common law, which delegated
fact-finding to a lay jury that could convict based on whatever evidence it
found persuasive. By contrast, the Roman-canon law of proof that governed
civil law criminal procedure required that inquisitorial judges find guilt to
86
be certain, and accept as proof only two eyewitnesses or the confession of
the accused, as the preambles to the two Henrican statutes accurately re87
count. Circumstantial evidence could not be the sole basis for a convic88
tion. As a result of these exacting proof requirements, civil law systems
89
turned to torture to extract the needed confession. Except in certain unusual cases, in which the crown ordered it and immunized those administering
it, torture was not used to extract evidence of guilt in English criminal pro90
cedure. This does not reflect a superior public morality on the part of the

83.
An Acte for punysshement of Pyrotes and Robbers of the See (Offenses at Sea
Act), 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 1 (1536); see also An Acte Conc[er]nyng Pyrottes and Robbers of the
See, 27 Hen. 8 c. 4, § 1 (1535). Two “almost identical acts passed in consecutive years appears to have been a consequence of the first not specifying treason as being within its scope,
something that was corrected by the second statute. After 1536 this [second statute] was the
only act normally referred to.” DURSTON, supra note 41, at 11–12.
84.
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN
THE ANCIEN RÉGIME 78, 138 (2006 ed.). To convict, a common law jury required “not certainty, but only persuasion. Well into the eighteenth century there were no firm rules establishing minimum standards of evidence for conviction” at common law. Id. at 80.
85.
Id. at 6; THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200–1800, at 3 (1985).
86.
LANGBEIN, supra note 84, at 6–7.
87.
Id. at 4; DURSTON, supra note 41, at 8–9.
88.
LANGBEIN, supra note 84, at 4; DURSTON, supra note 41, at 9.
89.
LANGBEIN, supra note 84, at 4–5.
90.
Id. at 81–139; DURSTON, supra note 41, at 9. Sometimes extrajudicial torture was
used on pirates during interrogations held for intelligence purposes—to elicit the names of
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English, but simply the fact that their common law proof system did not require confessions.
Expressly in order to make conviction easier—not out of a concern for
individual rights such as jury trial—the statutes of Henry VIII moved the
trial of piracies from civil law procedure to trial by the common law, or “af91
ter the comon course of the lawes of this Lande.” Trial of piracies would
still occur under the auspices of the Admiralty. The statutes provided that
the king would send out a commission under the great seal to the Lord Admiral or his deputies, who would assemble as an ad hoc court with “three or
92
foure such other substanciall p[er]sons” named by the Lord Chancellor. In
practice, the other substantial persons named were frequently common law
judges, who joined the civilian judges of admiralty to hear the cases of pira93
cy and other serious admiralty crimes. Grand juries and petit juries were
assembled from the shires and places in the realm specified in the king’s
94
commission. These courts proceedings became known as the Admiralty
95
Sessions.
This move to common law procedure facilitated convictions for piracy
96
because circumstantial evidence alone was now legally sufficient, and a
much looser burden of proof was employed by the lay factfinders. In addition, pirates who refused to plead guilty or not guilty—one or the other was
required in order to manifest the necessary consent to a jury trial—could
97
now be subject to “pressing” or, in medieval Latin, peine forte et dure. As
John Langbein explains, pressing entailed the defendant being “laid over
with weights that would crush him to death unless he relented” by entering a
98
plea and thereby consenting to jury trial. Civil liberties were far from the

confederates. See CLAIRE JOWITT, THE CULTURE OF PIRACY, 1580–1630: ENGLISH
LITERATURE AND SEABORNE CRIME 21 (2010) (describing an interrogation of pirates at the
Tower of London in 1583 employing torture).
91.
Offenses at Sea Act 1536, 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 1; see also 27 Hen. 8 c. 4, § 1 (1535).
92.
28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 1.
93.
See DURSTON, supra note 41, at 53; A.T. CARTER, OUTLINES OF ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 139 (London, Butterworth & Co. 1899).
94.
28 Hen. 8 c. 15, §§ 1–2.
95.
DURSTON, supra note 41, at 1, 12–13.
96.
See HANNA, supra note 27, at 30–31 (noting that pirates could be convicted based
solely on circumstantial evidence).
97.
See COKE, supra note 65, at 111–12 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797); MOLLOY,
supra note 71, at 70–71; 2 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
812 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne, 1806).
98.
LANGBEIN, supra note 84, at 76. Langbein explains that wealthy defendants often
chose death in this manner rather than consenting to jury trial in which they might be convicted, because conviction of a felony would bring forfeiture of one’s estate. Pre-conviction death
by pressing meant that one’s estate could descend to heirs. See id. at 75; see also BRYCE
LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 637 (2d ed. 1980)
(explaining the same point as Langbein).
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mind of Henry VIII and Parliament when they enacted these anti-piracy
statutes.

2. The Uncertain and Evolving Meaning of Due Process
Due process, at the time of the Henrican statutes and for centuries afterwards, did not have the purity that Chapman posits—a requirement of the
jury, for anyone, anywhere, formally charged with a crime by the English
government. Since this lesser claim by Chapman is incorrect, a fortiori his
stronger claim—that anyone who was suspected of engaging in conduct that
violated criminal or civil statutes could only be proceeded against by full
common law judicial procedure—also fails.
Magna Carta’s seemingly broad provisions in favor of liberty were in99
terpreted quite narrowly through the medieval period. Non-jury forms of
criminal process were thought to be entirely legal well into the seventeenth
century. Trial by battle, for example, was an available alternative to jury tri100
al for centuries, although little used. Throughout the Tudor period, the
king’s council exercised criminal powers, disregarding contrary statutes of
Parliament, though according to the historian Frederic Maitland, “the coun101
cil seems always to have shrunk from pronouncing the penalty of death.”
The Court of Star Chamber, which used civil-inquisitorial procedure, exercised a “very comprehensive criminal jurisdiction,” though also stopping
short of inflicting the death penalty, from the late fifteenth to the mid102
seventeenth century. Maitland thinks it beyond doubt that Star Chamber
and its procedure “was regarded as perfectly legal” through the reign of
103
James I (1603-25). During the troubled reign of Charles I (1625-49), Star
Chamber became overtly political and aggressively prosecuted political and
religious dissent. Its legality was then attacked by common lawyers like
104
Edward Coke, and Parliament eventually abolished it. Until the Long Parliament overthrew Charles I and moved against prerogative courts, the
Court of High Commission, an ecclesiastical court using canon-civil law
105
procedure, had also exercised a criminal jurisdiction over the laity.

99.
See J.H. Baker, Personal Liberty Under the Common Law of England, 1200–1600,
in THE ORIGINS OF MODERN FREEDOM IN THE WEST 178, 191 (R.W. Davis ed., 1995). On the
feudal context and meaning of Magna Carta, see G.O. SAYLES, THE MEDIEVAL
FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLAND 399–408 (1950).
100.
See F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 212 (1919).
101.
Id. at 217–19.
102.
Id. at 219–21, 261–63; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 119; LYON, supra note
98, at 616; Thomas G. Barnes, Due Process and Slow Process in the Late Elizabethan-Early
Stuart Star Chamber, 6 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 221, 227–31 (1962).
103.
MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 262.
104.
BAKER, supra note 21, at 472–74.
105.
MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 264–66.
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Criminal procedure that departed from the common lawyers’ ideal was
also used in distant, difficult to govern parts of the realm. For instance, after
a Catholic revolt, Henry VIII created the Council of the North, a nonstatutory administrative and judicial body for York and other rebellious
106
northern counties. The council exercised a criminal jurisdiction, according
to the king’s commission, “to hear and determine [criminal cases] according
to the laws and customs of our Realm of England, or otherwise according to
107
your sound discretion.”
The common lawyers did largely triumph during the battles of the seventeenth century—well over one hundred years after the anti-piracy statutes
of Henry VIII. To a great extent, the criminal jurisdiction of courts which
did not follow full common law procedure was removed—Star Chamber,
the Court of High Commission, the Council of the North, and an analogous
conciliar court for Wales and the Welsh March were abolished by Parlia108
ment in 1641. At the same time, Parliament re-enacted the “law of the
land” provision of Magna Carta and the “due process of law” clauses of
statutes from the time of Edward III—suggesting that common law proce109
dure was the process that was due in criminal cases. During the crises of
the seventeenth century, common lawyers and their Parliamentary allies
pressed hard the idea that fundamental English liberties, such as jury trial,
110
could never lawfully be withheld from a criminal defendant.
The common law of criminal procedure continued its advance even after the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660. But it did not fully vanquish all
competitors. Both as a matter of theory and practice, common law criminal
procedure with its jury trial never attained the supremacy and universality
that Chapman claims. First, as a matter of theory, parliamentary supremacy
and the absence of American-style judicial review meant that claims of fundamental, non-derogable rights to certain legal procedures were tenuous,
especially after the enormous assertion of parliamentary power represented
111
by the Glorious Revolution of 1688. By Blackstone’s time, the supremacy

106.
Id. at 263–64.
107.
R.R. REID, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN THE NORTH 282 (1921) (emphasis added).
108.
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 193
(Liberty Fund 2010) (1929); PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO
EMPIRE 224–25 (2010); see also An Act for the Regulating of the Privy Council and for taking away the Court commonly called the Star–Chamber (Habeas Corpus Act), 16 Car. c. 10, §
1 (1640). The Petition of Right of 1628 had also re-enacted those clauses. See Petition of
Right, 3 Car. c. 1, §§ 3–4 (1628) (reaffirming “law of the land” and “due process of law” provisions).
109.
The Petition of Right of 1628 had also re-enacted those clauses. See Petition of
Right, 3 Car. c. 1, §§ 3–4 (1628) (reaffirming “law of the land” and “due process of law” provisions).
110.
See J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
123 (1955).
111.
See BAKER, supra note 21, at 208–11; PLUCKNETT, supra note 108, at 336–37.
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112

of Parliament was orthodoxy in England. Parliament could change procedure, and this could become the new “law of the land” and new “due process.” Common lawyers might object, and these objections would have the
weight of arguments about violation of the “ancient constitution” to buttress
113
them. But Parliament’s expressed will would still control.
In addition, there were geographical limits to the reach of English liberties, especially for aliens (as those who were not English subjects were
called). Englishmen residing abroad in the colonies and other English possessions were understood to carry with them most of their traditional, fundamental liberties, though there were of course disputes about the precise
114
content. Englishmen who encountered English governmental power in
other locations could likely also draw on their English liberties. The rules
were different, however, for those who were not English subjects. At common law, protection of the laws was understood to stand in a reciprocal rela115
tionship with allegiance to the government. Only persons owing allegiance to the government were under the protection of the government and
its laws and courts. Only persons within protection because of their allegiance had standing to invoke the protection of the courts and were shielded
by rights under domestic law. Subjects paradigmatically owed allegiance
116
and were within protection. Non-subjects, when peacefully visiting or residing in England, owed a local or temporary allegiance to the government,
117
and so they temporarily had corresponding protection. That protection

112.
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *156, *178. See generally GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 260–61 (1998); John
Phillip Reid, “In Our Contracted Sphere”: The Constitutional Contract, the Stamp Act Crisis,
and the Coming of the American Revolution, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 42–43 (1976).
113.
See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND FEUDAL LAW
(1987) (showing how Coke and other common lawyers ahistorically argued that common law
procedures had existed from time immemorial).
114.
See, e.g., Eliga H. Gould, Liberty and Modernity: The American Revolution and the
Marking of Parliament’s Imperial History, in EXCLUSIONARY EMPIRE: ENGLISH LIBERTY
OVERSEAS, 1600–1900, at 112, 113 (Jack P. Greene ed., 2010); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, English
Liberties Outside England: Floors, Doors, Windows, and Ceilings in the Legal Architecture of
Empire, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH LAW AND LITERATURE, 1500–1700, at 747,
747–49 (Lorna Hutson ed., 2017).
115.
This paragraph is based on Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1823 passim (2009); Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters: The Court’s
Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153, 176–96
(2013) [hereinafter Kent, Enemy Fighters]; Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 502–
05.
116.
See 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 59 (The Savoy, E. & R. Nutt, & R. Gosling 1736); 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 75, at *354; see also Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 115, at 177.
117.
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *358; M[ICHAEL] FOSTER, A REPORT OF
SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF OYER AND TERMINER AND GAOL DELIVERY
FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746 IN THE COUNTY OF SURRY, AND OF OTHER
CROWN CASES 183 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762); see also Hamburger, supra note 115, at
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disappeared, however, when the obligation of allegiance did—in other
words, when the foreigner left the country. As Blackstone put it, “as the
prince affords his protection to an alien, only during his residence in this
realm, the allegiance of an alien is confined (in point of time) to the duration
of such his residence, and (in point of locality) to the dominions of the Brit118
ish empire.” This fundamental legal framework structured how the government evaluated the entitlement of different persons and different places
to protection of domestic law and courts. As we will see, the English government and legal commentators referred to this framework and incorporated its premises when thinking about the law of piracy suppression.
In practice, even after the common lawyers largely triumphed in the
seventeenth century, not all crimes were adjudicated with full common law
procedure. For instance, justices of the peace had long had authority to hear
crimes of a lesser grade than felony without a jury, and this was expanded
119
greatly after the Restoration.
And then there was the case of piracy and related crimes committed on
the high seas. As discussed, since 1535–36, these crimes were tried at Admiralty Sessions using common law criminal procedure, including a grand
jury and petit jury. But as we have seen, the change to common law procedure was not motivated by a belief that there was fundamental legal entitlement to such procedure. Blackstone, the great partisan for the common law,
was grossly embellishing when he claimed that the Henrican anti-piracy
statutes were motivated by a concern for individual rights under the com120
121
mon law. Chapman appears to uncritically accept Blackstone’s error.
Blackstone is correct, however, that after upheaval of the seventeenth century, the common lawyers’ long-held view that an English court should not
inflict the death penalty except via common law procedures prevailed, and
the argument that these procedures should be extended to non-petty but noncapital crimes was gaining force.

3. The Anti-Piracy Statute of William III
Chapman presents as an unfortunate deviation from a supposed common law norm the decision of Parliament near the turn of the eighteenth
century to allow piracies to be tried without a jury in specially-constituted

1847, 1898–1901; Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 115, at 177; Kent, Global Constitution,
supra note 7, at 503.
118.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *370.
119.
PLUCKNETT, supra note 108, at 438–39.
120.
See supra Blackstone quotation accompanying note 79; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *265 (stating that the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction under civil law procedures “was contrary to the genius of the law of England; inasmuch as a man might there be
deprived of his life by the opinion of a single judge, without the judgment of his peers.”).
121.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 394.
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admiralty courts located in English colonies or on shipboard. For Chapman, this statute was an “exception” for pirates “from common law protec123
tions . . . for the sake of expediency.” But he presents no evidence suggesting that either colonists in the Americas or Englishmen back home
viewed these courts as illegal.
To be sure, American colonists did complain about Britain’s novel uses
of vice-admiralty courts in the colonies. The courts, which sat without juries
and followed civil law procedure, were specifically enumerated in formal
accounts of the colonial Americans’ reasons for dissatisfaction with the
British government and, eventually, the need for revolution. For instance,
the Declaration of the so-called Stamp Act Congress in 1765 stated that “trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in
these colonies,” and that the Stamp Act “and several other acts, by extending the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty beyond its ancient limits, have
124
a manifest tendency to subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists.”
The Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, adopted
by the Continental Congress on July 6, 1775, stated:
[S]tatutes have been passed for extending the Jurisdiction of Courts
of Admiralty and Vice-Admiralty beyond their ancient limits; for
depriving us of the accustomed and inestimable Privilege of Trial
125
by Jury in Cases affecting both Life and Property.
And one year later, the Declaration of Independence admonished King
George III “[f]or depriving us in many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Ju126
ry.”
127
Chapman links these grievances to the statute of William III’s time,
An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracies, which allowed piracies and related high-seas felonies to be tried without a jury in specially128
constituted admiralty courts located in English colonies or on shipboard.

122.
See An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 Will. 3 c. 7, § 4 (1698)
(stating that the courts will hear cases “according to the civil law and the methods and rules of
the Admiralty”).
123.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 394–95.
124.
An Act for granting and applying certain Stamp Duties and other Duties in the British Colonies and Plantations in America (the Stamp Act), 5 Geo. 3 c. 12 (1765). In June 1765,
soon after the passage of the act, the Massachusetts legislature sent a circular inviting all the
colonies to send delegates to a congress at New York in October, 1765 to develop a joint protest against the Stamp Act and other imperial trade regulations. Representatives from Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina attended.
125.
DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS (1775), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 295, 295 (Richard L. Perry ed., rev. ed. 1978).
126.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (1776).
127.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 381, 389, 397.
128.
See An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 Will. 3, c. 7, § 4
(1698) (stating that the courts will hear cases “according to the civil law and the methods and
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His suggestion appears to be that American colonists were also objecting to
jury-less trials of pirates when they protested the Stamp Act and other trade
regulations that allowed revenue cases to be heard, at the option of the government, either in vice-admiralty courts without a jury or in common law
courts with one. But Chapman presents no evidence of any linkage in the
minds of American colonists, and I have found none.
First of all, the colonial vice-admiralty courts that Americans protested
against were legally and institutionally distinct from the courts in which piracies could be tried without a jury. Just as piracies in England were tried
not in the standing High Court Admiralty but in ad hoc Admiralty Sessions
129
convened periodically under a commission issued by the crown, trials of
pirates held in the colonies or on shipboard under the new statute of William
III occurred not in standing colonial vice-admiralty courts but in ad hoc
130
courts created for the occasion. The judge of the standing colonial viceadmiralty court was often appointed to be a member of the bench of the ad
hoc sessions, and so these court sessions for trying piracies outside of Eng131
land were sometimes referred to as sittings of the vice-admiralty court.
But that was not strictly accurate. The regularly-constituted colonial viceadmiralty courts did not and could not try piracies or other felonies on the
132
high seas.
It is unclear if many piracy trials in the colonies actually took place
133
without a jury, even though that option was legally available. And Chaprules of the Admiralty”). By the same statute, admiralty sessions for trial of piracies could also
be convened in the colonies under the statute of the Offenses at Seas Act of 1536, see id. § 14,
something that had been determined in 1684 was not allowed under then-existing law. See
JOEL H. BAER, PIRATES OF THE BRITISH ISLES 25 (2005).
129.
Offenses at Sea Act of 1536, 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 1.
130.
See DAVID R. OWEN & MICHAEL C. TOLLEY, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY IN
COLONIAL AMERICA: THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE, 1634–1776, at 5–6 (1995); CARL
UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 17 n.18
(1960); Charles M. Andrews, Introduction to RECORDS OF THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS OF
RHODE ISLAND: 1716–1752, at 1, 3–4 (Dorothy S. Towle ed., 1936).
131.
Andrews, supra note 130, at 4 n.1.
132.
OWEN & TOLLEY, supra note 130, at 5–6; UBBELOHDE, supra note 130, at 17 n.18;
Andrews, supra note 130, at 3.
133.
The piracy act of William III allowed piracy trials in the colonies to occur in either
vice-admiralty or under the statute of 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, which would mean using a jury. See An
Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 Will. 3 c. 7, § 14(1698). That act expired
after seven years plus the term of Parliament then sitting, see id. § 13, but it was renewed several times, then made permanent in 1719. See 6 Geo. c. 19 (1719). And before then, in 1717,
Parliament provided again that persons to be tried under 11 Will. 3 c. 7 “may be” instead tried
according to the procedures of 28 Hen. 8 c. 15. 4 Geo. c. 11, § 7 (1717). Reports of piracy
trials in the colonies reveal that juries were sometimes used and sometimes not. See, e.g., The
Trials of Major Stede Bonnet and Thirty Three Others, at the Court of Vice-Admiralty at
Charles-Town in South Carolina, for Piracy, Octob. 30, &c. 1718, in 6 A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD II TO THE END OF THE
REIGN OF KING GEORGE I 156 (2d ed., London, 1730) (jury trial) [hereinafter Stede Bonnet
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man has not established that there was any major current of opinion that
viewed jury-less trials of pirates as unlawful. American colonial lawyers
were well aware that the move to common law procedure in the statutes of
Henry VIII was motivated by a desire to make it easier to convict, rather
than a view that accused pirates were entitled to a jury. We know this indirectly because many printed authorities available to Americans recounted
134
the true reasons for the statutory change. And we see direct evidence of
this knowledge in legal arguments by, for instance, John Adams, in a 1769
135
piracy case before an admiralty court in Boston, and in statements by oth136
er American colonial lawyers. Since it was known that common law procedure in piracy cases was not motivated by civil liberties concerns, it is not
clear that the absence of a jury would have been viewed with much disfavor.
Further evidence of an apparent lack of concern about jury-less trials of
pirates during the colonial period comes from a post-independence document produced by John Jay, while serving as the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Continental Congress in 1785. In discussing what powers his
government had under the Articles of Confederation with regard to trial of
piracy, Jay described the anti-piracy act of William III in a positive light. He
wrote that the statute “rendered more extensive and effectual” the crown’s
powers to prosecute piracy and enacted “many useful Things on this Sub137
ject.”
In any event, American colonial-era protests about vice-admiralty
courts were clearly directed at a very different phenomenon than piracy tri-

Trial]; The Trial and Condemnation of Captain John Quelch and Others of his Company, &c.
for Sundry Piracies, Robberies, and Murder, Committed upon the Subjects of the King of Portugal, Her Majesty’s Ally, on the coast of Brazil, &c., at the Court-House in Boston, in 14 A
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND
OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 1067, 1073–74 (London, T.C. Hansard 1812) (bench
trial) [hereinafter John Quelch Trial].
134.
See, e.g., COKE, supra note 65, at 111–12 (describing the “mischief” which motivated the Offenses at Sea Act of 1536, 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, as set out in the preamble); A
DISCOURSE OF THE LAWS RELATING TO PIRATES AND PIRACIES, AND THE MARINE AFFAIRS
OF GREAT BRITAIN 7–8 (London, W. Wilkins 1726) (setting out the preamble of 28 Hen. 8 c.
15); WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 98 (The Savoy, Eliz.
Nutt 1716) (stating that the Henrican statutes were enacted because proving piracy and other
crimes under civil law procedures was “very inconvenient, because by that Law no Offender
shall have Judgment of Death, without his own Confession, or direct proof by EyeWitnesses[.]”). For later post-Revolutionary works published in the United States, see 5
MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 311 (1st American ed., Philadelphia,
Phillip H. Nicklin 1813) (1768); 7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST
OF AMERICAN LAW 91 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1824).
135.
2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 526–28 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston,
Charles C Little & James Brown 1850).
136.
See John Quelch Trial, supra note 133, at 1074, 1086 (statements of Queen’s Advocate and Attorney General Paul Dudley).
137.
29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 797 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1933).
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als—which, as noted above, did not occur in the ordinary vice-admiralty
courts. Americans protested navigation and trade laws like the Stamp and
138
Sugar Acts of 1764 and 1765 because of taxation without representation
139
in Parliament, in violation of their claimed rights as Englishmen, and because the statutes allowed the bypassing of colonial juries in the common
law courts when crown officials chose to seek forfeitures of property or
140
fines and penalties via vice-admiralty courts. It was these complaints, not
any concern about jury-less trial of pirates, that appeared in the Declaration
of Independence, the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking
Up Arms, and countless other, lesser-known American colonial complaints
about courts and juries.

C. English Government Practice
1. Pirates on the Seas Were Outside the Protection of English Law
English government practice was inconsistent with Chapman’s claim
that anyone, anywhere, who was suspected of violating English criminal
statutes could only be dealt with by the English government via the criminal
justice system (using common law procedures). There is abundant evidence
that the English and, after the 1706–07 Acts of Union, British government
did not believe that it was compelled by domestic law—common law due
process rights of individuals—to treat all pirates it encountered as putative
criminal defendants who could only be proceeded against by the ordinary
course of law. Both the Royal Navy and colonial forces in the Americas

138.
Sugar Act, 4 Geo. 3 c. 15 (1764); Stamp Act , 5 Geo. 3 c. 12 (1765). On these acts
and the American reaction, see, for example, EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN,
THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (3d ed. 1995). See generally
LAWRENCE A. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS (1939).
139.
See, e.g., The Virginia Resolves (1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION:
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–DWí (Gmund
S. Morgan ed., 1959); The Rhode Island Resolves (1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, supra, at
 í )RUD WKRURXJKUHYLHZRI WKH $PHULFDQ DQG %ULWLVK OHJDOSHUVSHFWLYHVVHHJOHN
PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY
TO TAX (1987).
140.
See, e.g., The Pennsylvania Resolves (1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, supra
note 139 DW  í 7KH 0DU\ODQG 5HVROYHV   reprinted in PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, supra
note 139 DW  í 2Q WKH $PHULFDQ UHDFWLRQ VHH  JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES í  OWEN & TOLLEY, supra note
130, at 5; Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts (Part I), 26
J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 581, 594 (1995); David S. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The
Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–1776, 16 WM. & MARY Q. 459,
í  
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killed large numbers of pirates in combat actions, and also summarily ex142
ecuted captured pirates. Although it may often be true that actions speak
louder than words, in this context the opposite is the case. During the heat of
confrontation with a hated enemy, military and law enforcement officials
sometimes get carried away by emotion or passion. Merely observing the
infliction of, say, summary executions or failing to give quarter does not tell
us definitely that those actions comported with legal understandings. In this
context, the better evidence is what statutes, royal proclamations, commissions, and other official pronouncements of the law stated, as well as what
lawyers, jurists, and other commentators said about the law. There we see
voluminous evidence against Chapman’s thesis.
143
Following the well-settled rule of the law of nations, English law
treated pirates encountered on the seas as persons outside of the protection
of the laws. Queen Elizabeth in 1569 proclaimed “all pyrats and rovers upon

141.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PASTORE, BETWEEN LAND AND SEA: THE ATLANTIC
COAST AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NEW ENGLAND 165 (2014) (describing 1723 battle in
which a Royal Navy warship killed and captured pirates off Long Island); Letter from Captain
Ogle, Commander of HM’s Ship Swallow, to the Admiralty Office (Apr. 5, 1722), in A FULL
AND EXACT ACCOUNT, OF THE TRYAL OF ALL THE PYRATES, LATELY TAKEN BY CAPTAIN
OGLE, ON BOARD THE SWALLOW MAN OF WAR, ON THE COAST OF GUINEA, at iv–vi (London, J. Roberts 1723) (recounting two ship-to-ship actions in which at least 27 pirates were
killed or wounded off Africa); CALENDAR OF TREASURY PAPERS, í at 467 (Joseph
Redington ed., London, Longmans & Co. 1883) (“As to the claims of Capt. Gordon, of H.M.
ship ‘Pearl,’ and Capt. Brand, of H.M. ship the ‘Lyme,’ the Lieut.-Governor of Virginia
(Spotswood) certifies that two ships were hired and furnished with pilots at his expense, and
armed by Gordon and Brand, and were sent to North Carolina to apprehend and destroy Edward Thatch, a notorious pirate, and his crew. Ten pirates were killed on Thatch’s sloop, and
eight more taken prisoner. Four other pirates . . . were taken by Capt. Gordon, and convicted
before the Court of Admiralty.”); CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA
AND WEST INDIES, 1661–1668, at 284 (W. Noel Sainsbury ed., London, HM’s Stationery Office 1880) (describing combat action in which an English naval vessel off Jamaica killed a
pirate captain and “many of his men,” bringing in twelve prisoners) (entry 950).
142.
See, e.g., C.H. HARING, THE BUCCANEERS IN THE WEST INDIES IN THE XVII
CENTURY 254 (1910) (“Captain Spragge [commanding HMS Ruby in 1687] sailed into Port
Royal with the buccaneer and three of his companions hanging at the yard-arms, ‘a spectacle
of great satisfaction to all good people.’”) (citation omitted); CALENDAR OF TREASURY
PAPERS, 1714–1719, supra note 141, at 467 (“The Governor of South Carolina (Robert Johnson, Esq.), appointed Col. Wm. Rhett to be commander of two sloops fitted out to take certain
pirates which infested the coast, and the Col. at Cape Fear River, took a pirate sloop called the
‘Revenge,’ . . . and the commander and crew, consisting of 35 men, were executed. Petitioner
Rhett prayed an order for payment to him of 890l. for the captors.”); see also 1 J. FENIMORE
COOPER, THE HISTORY OF THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 21 (Philadelphia,
Lea & Blanchard 1839) (discussing the Col. Rhett attack and stating that “a desperate encounter took place, in which, it would seem, it was the intention not to give quarter, as nearly all in
the [pirate] sloop were killed” and the remainder tried).
143.
Supra Section II.A.
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the seas to be out of her protection” and “public enemies[.]” David Lewes,
a judge of the Admiralty, reiterated in about 1579 that the queen’s proclamation meant that “all pyrats and rovers upon the seas” may be “lawful145
ly . . . by any person taken, punished, and suppressed with extremity.” Sir
Leoline Jenkins, another judge of the Admiralty, instructed a jury in 1668
that “all Pirates and Searovers . . . are outlaw’d, as I may say, by the Law of
all Nations; that is, out of the Protection of all Princes and all Laws whatsoever. Every Body is commissioned, and is to be armed against them, as
146
against Rebels and Traytors, to subdue and to root them out.” King James
I in 1603 proclaimed that “Pirats and Rovers upon the Seas” were outside
the protection of the king and his laws and “lawfully [may] bee by any per147
son taken, punished, and suppressed with extremitie.”
International law—when it deemed pirates outside the protection of the
law—was treating the high seas as a state of nature where the inherent right
to lethal self-defense was always available. Domestically, when monarchs
and their Admiralty judges stated that pirates were outside the law, even if
the pirates were English subjects, they were referencing the ancient judgment of outlawry. Outlawry, “one of the oldest weapons of the Common
Law,” meant that the person against who such judgment was entered—for
evading legal process after indictment for treason or felony—was “entirely
148
beyond the protection of the law in every sense.” An outlaw “was said to
have caput lupinum, in other words to be like a wolf, a hateful beast which
149
it was the duty of every man to exterminate.” In the thirteenth century, the
medieval jurist Henry de Bracton reported that it was lawful to kill outright
an outlaw within the realm only in essentially lawless regions, like the

144.
1 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 224 (R. G.
Marsden ed., 1915) (referring to the proclamation); see also ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF
PIRACY 59 (2d ed. 1998) (dating the proclamation).
145.
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, supra note 144, at
224.
146.
1 WILLIAM WYNNE, THE LIFE OF SIR LEOLINE JENKINS, at xxxvi (London, 1724),
reprinted in 3 EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER READINGS
ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 518, 518 (1929).
147.
King James I, A Proclamation to Represse all Piracies and Depredations upon the
Sea (Sept. 30, 1603), in STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS: ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS OF KING
JAMES I, 1603–1625, at 53, 55 (James F. Larkin & Paul L. Hughes eds., 1973); see also King
James I, A Proclamation with Certaine Ordinances to be Observed by his Majesties Subjects
Toward the King of Spain (July 6, 1605), in STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS: ROYAL
PROCLAMATIONS OF KING JAMES I, 1603–1625, supra, at 114, 116. The 1603 proclamation
also had a law enforcement directive, ordering that pirate cases be “summarily heard” by the
Admiralty so that punishment may be inflicted “with such severities, as the example thereof
shall terrifie all others from committing any so odious crimes.” King James I, A Proclamation
to Represse all Piracies and Depredations upon the Sea (Sept. 30, 1603) at 53, 54.
148.
H. Erle Richards, Is Outlawry Obsolete?, 18 L.Q. REV. 297, 298 (1902).
149.
Id.; accord 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 502 (Liberty Fund 2010) (1895).
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150

Welsh March. The law of outlawry again softened during the reign of
Edward III (1327–77), so that only a crown officer with a judicial warrant
151
could kill the outlaw on sight. But even so, if caught, the outlaw was hung
152
without trial. Although additional judicial and royal means to lessen the
harshness of outlawry were introduced over time, the basic concept persist153
ed for centuries.
It was thus a profound statement of pirates’ lack of protection from the
laws to state that they could be treated as ancient outlaws. Pirates were frequently described as beasts—a shorthand way of linking their fate to that of
outlaws. Charles Molloy, the seventeenth century barrister and maritime law
treatise writer, wrote that anyone who captures pirates on the ocean “may
execute such Beasts of Prey immediately, without any Solemnity of Con154
demnation.” And further, if captors did bring pirates to port to stand trial,
but “the Judge openly rejects the Tryal, or the Captors cannot wait for the
Judge without certain peril and loss,” the pirates may, by the “Law of Na155
ture,” be “executed by the Captors.” A writer of another popular marine
law treatise declared in the early eighteenth century that it was “the duty of
all Princes, Potentates and People whatsoever, to do what is in their Power
156
for the total Extirpation of” pirates, which he called “ravenous Beasts,”
thus invoking the language of the ancient law of outlawry.
Calling pirates “ravenous beasts” or “beasts of prey,” in addition to referencing outlawry and the right of self-defense in the state of nature, may
also have been an invocation by analogy of the old common law rule that
allowed anyone to kill dangerous beasts, even on another person’s private
157
land, “because the destroying of such creatures is a public advantage.”
Linking pirates to ravenous beasts thus triply marked them as fair game—by
the law of nations, the common law of outlawry, and the common law of
game hunting—as long as pirates were encountered on the high seas and not
near a place where common law trial could be had.

POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 149, at 503.
See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81, at 605 & n.2; GILES JACOB, THE MODERN
JUSTICE 166 (London, 1716); 3 BACON, supra note 134, at 746 (London, W. Strahan & M.
Woodhall 1778).
152.
3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81, at 605; see also GREEN, supra note 85DWí
153.
3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81í
154.
MOLLOY, supra note 71, at 61.
155.
Id.
156.
ALEXANDER JUSTICE, A GENERAL TREATISE OF THE DOMINION OF THE SEA 475
(2d ed., London, D. Leach 1709).
157.
2 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 75
(Windham, John Byrne 1795); accord 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *416; 2 RICHARD
BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 52 (6th ed., London, Henry Lintot
Law Printer 1758); THE GAME LAW í G HG /RQGRQ 5LFKDUG  (GZDUG $WN\QV
1707).
150.
151.

Fall 2018]

Piracy and Due Process

413

Thus in 1718, Nicholas Trott, Chief Justice of the Province of South
Carolina and a judge of vice-admiralty, told a grand jury that “in our law,”
pirates “are termed ‘Brutes’ and ‘Beasts of Prey’: and that it is lawful for
any one that takes them, if they cannot with Safety to themselves bring them
158
under some Government to be tried, to put them to Death.” In 1704, during the trial of the pirate Captain John Quelch, the Attorney General for the
Massachusetts Bay colony and her Majesty’s advocate for the court of admiralty, Paul Dudley, told the court and jurors:
[P]irates are not entitled to law . . . [f]or which reason it is said, if
piracy be committed upon the ocean, and the pirates in the attempt
happen to be overcome, the captors are not obliged to bring them to
any port, but may expose them immediately to punishment, by
hanging them at the main-yard; a sign of it being of a very different
and worse nature than any crime committed upon the land; for robbers and murderers, and even traitors themselves, may not be put to
159
death without passing a formal trial.
James Smith, the King’s Advocate General argued to an admiralty court
in very similar terms at a piracy trial in Massachusetts Bay colony in 1717:
[T]he Law of all Nations, that have setled into regular Governments, define & declare a Pirate to be an Enemy of Mankind. And
therefore he can claim the Protection of no Prince, the privilege of
no Country, the benefit of no Law; He is denied common humanity . . . nor is he to be otherwise dealt with, than a wild & savage
160
Beast, which every Man may lawfully destroy.
Sir David Dalrymple, Her Majesty’s Solicitor, argued at a 1705 piracy
trial that “pirates are worse than ravenous beasts,” because they are in “per161
petual War with every Individual.” A law compilation published in 1767
in Britain for use of the Admiralty agreed: “Captors are not oblig’d to bring
the Pirates they take on the Ocean to any Port, but may punish them imme162
diately, by hanging them up at the Main-Yard End.”

158.
Stede Bonnet Trial, supra note 133, at 156, 158.
159.
John Quelch Trial, supra note 133DWí
160.
THE TRIALS OF EIGHT PERSONS INDITED FOR PIRACY 6 (Boston, B. Green 1718),
microformed on Early American Imprints, Series I No. 2003 (Readex).
161.
THE TRYAL OF CAPTAIN THOMAS GREEN AND HIS CREW 47–48 (Edinburgh, Andrew Anderson 1705).
162.
1 THE LAWS, ORDINANCES AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ADMIRALTY OF GREAT
BRITAIN, CIVIL AND MILITARY 225 (London, 1746).
An unusually lenient, minority view on piracy and summary violence was issued in 1676
by Richard Lloyd, judge of admiralty in England, in a legal opinion for the Lords of Trades
and Plantations concerning the trial of a pirate in Jamaica. In the course of discussing the jurisdiction of colonial admiralty courts, Lloyd wrote: “True it is that pirates and sea-rovers are,
in the eye of the law, hostes humani generis; they are diffidati outlawed, as I may say, and out
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In addition to legal officials of the crown, “[m]ost legal commentators . . . thought that summary justice, in the form of immediate hanging
from the yardarm, could be meted out quite legally to pirates caught red163
handed, if there was no legal forum readily available to try them.” According to Charles Viner, the lawyer who endowed the chair at Oxford later
held by Blackstone, wrote, in a paraphrase of Molloy:
If piracy be committed on the ocean, and the pirates in the attempt
there happen to [be] overcome, the captors are not obliged to bring
them to any port, but may expose them immediately to punishment,
and hang them up at the main-yard end . . . for the old natural liber164
ty remains in places where there are no judgment.
Many other legal authorities made the same points,
166
thors.

165

as did lay au-

of the protection of the law of nations; every man is commissioned to seize and slay them, if
they make opposition; but if they yield, or be taken, they are to be tried criminally according
to the prescribed form, and the practice in such cases.” WILLIAM FORSYTH, CASES AND
OPINIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE
111, 112 (London, Stevens & Haynes 1869) (quoting Sir Richard Lloyd). The fact that this
was an opinion for the Lords of Trades and Plantations is shown in CALENDAR OF STATE
PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1675–1676, at 432 (W. Noel Sainsbury ed., London, HM’s Stationery Office 1893) (entry 993). The opinion in the Calendar of
State Papers is a condensed summary and contains a typographical mistake (“stay” for
“slay”). Lloyd’s reference to pirates being “diffidati outlawed” is obscure. Treating pirates as
ancient outlaws was discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 148–153. Lloyd’s
use of diffidati may have come from a medieval legal treatise by Bartolus de Saxoferrato
(1313–1357), which discussed piracy and used diffidati to state that pirates had “renounced”
the law and thus were outside the protection of the law. See HEEBØLL-HOLM, supra note 39, at
13 (quoting the text of Bartolus).
163.
DURSTON, supra note 41, at 25; see also MARGARETTE LINCOLN, BRITISH PIRATES
AND SOCIETY, 1680–1730, at 65 (2014) (“Those [pirates] captured on the open sea, remote
from any port that could sustain due legal process, could, according to marine law, be immediately put to death by hanging at the captor’s main yard.”).
164.
16 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 346 (2d ed.,
London, 1793) (italicization and capitalization in original omitted).
165.
See, e.g., JUSTICE, supra note 156, at 477 (“Captors are not obliged to bring the Pirates they take on the Ocean to any Port, but may Punish them immediately, by hanging them
up at the Main-Yard end.”); A DISCOURSE OF THE LAWS RELATING TO PIRATES AND
PIRACIES AND THE MARINE AFFAIRS OF GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 134, at 4–5 (“[I]n our
Law Books they [pirates] are term’d Brutes and Beasts of Prey; and it is allowed to be lawful
for those who take them, to put them to Death, if they cannot, with Safety to themselves, bring
them under some Government to be try’d.”); 2 A GENERAL TREATISE OF NAVAL TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AS FOUNDED ON THE LAWS AND STATUTES OF THE REALM 255 (The Savoy, E.
& R. Nutt, & R. Gosling 1739) (“If Piracy be attempted on the Ocean, and the Pirates are vanquished, the Captors may in such Case immediately inflict a Punishment, by hanging them up
at the Main-Yard End, and they are not obliged to bring them to any Port; but this understood
only on Places where no legal Judgment can be obtained.”); GILES JACOB, LEX MERCATORIA
188 (2d ed., The Savoy, E. & R. Nutt, & R. Gosling 1729) (same) [hereinafter LEX
MERCATORIA]; GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY [hereinafter JACOB, DICTIONARY]
(8th ed., London, H. Woodfall & H. Strahan 1762) (“Piracy”: “If Piracy attempted on the
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Molloy’s canonical views on summary execution of pirates were quoted
and endorsed in a House of Commons debate in 1699, concerning the propriety of a royal commission granting the right to take property from suspected pirates without a judicial finding of guilt. To help show that judicial
condemnation was not needed for pirates’ property to pass by the king’s
grant, Sir William Cowper, member of Parliament and king’s counsel, argued: “Question, who may take, and destroy a pirate. Any one, tho not
commissioned by the prince and may hang him at the yard arm, says the
167
booke de jure maritime et navali” by Molloy. If death could be imposed
without trial, so could property transfer. Sir Edward Harley reiterated the
168
same point, paraphrasing Molloy. No speaker disagreed, and the motion
169
to condemn as illegal the king’s commission failed.
The analogy to ancient outlawry is instructive on the policy reasons for
the rule that pirates could be summarily killed on the high seas. Outlawry
was needed at a time when the modern state did not exist and law enforce170
ment resources were almost nonexistent. A powerful tool was needed to
prod accused offenders to voluntarily submit to the judicial system. The
threat of execution on sight (if outlawed) was that tool. Even as the English
state developed in size and capacity on land, and the rules about outlawry
were reformed, the high seas remained a vast, unpoliced, and essentially
lawless place. The allowance of military assault on suspected pirates and
summary execution of captured pirates were the blunt but effective tools
that the law deployed in that domain. In addition, we must remember that, in

Ocean, if the Pirates are overcome, the Takers may immediately inflict a Punishment, by
hanging them up at the Main-yard End; though this is understood where no legal Judgment
may be maintained.”); 1 ANDREW MACDOWELL BANKTON, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF
SCOTLAND IN CIVIL RIGHTS 528 (Edinburgh, R. Fleming 1751) (“Where piracy is committed
in the ocean, and the pirates, in the attempt, happen to be overcome, the captors are not
obliged to bring those beasts of prey to any port, but may expose them immediately to punishment, by hanging them up at the main yard end; for the natural liberty remains in places
where there are no judicatures.”).
166.
See, e.g., COTTON MATHER, INSTRUCTIONS TO THE LIVING, FROM THE CONDITION
OF THE DEAD 17 (Boston, John Allen 1717) (delivering a funeral oration about hanged pirates
and stating “[a]ll Nations agree, to treat your Tribe, as the Common Enemies of Mankind, and
Extirpate them out of the World”); NEWS FROM THE SEA OR, THE TAKING OF THE CRUEL
PIRATE 1 (London, 1674) (“[I]n all Ages they [pirates] have been esteemed, Humani Generis
hostes, Publique Enemies to Mankind whom every one was obliged to oppose and destroy, as
we do Common vermine that Infest and trouble us.”).
167.
2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENTS RESPECTING
NORTH AMERICA, 1689–1702, at 327 (Leo Francis Stock ed., 1927) (statement of William
Cowper on Dec. 6, 1699).
168.
Id. at 331 (“A pirate is hostis humani generis. By the law of nations every man,
without a commission from any prince is impowered to take and destroy him; and may hang
him at the yard arm. He may execute such beasts of prey immediately without any solemnity
of condemnation.”) (statement of Edward Harley on Dec. 6, 1699).
169.
See id. at 316 (motion), 336 (vote).
170.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 149, at 502.
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the age of sail, a seaborne journey could last many months. It would be extremely dangerous to keep captured pirates on board a vessel for that length
of time. And a ship’s limited stores of water and food could be depleted if it
operated for a lengthy period as a floating jail for a captured pirate crew.
Understanding this context helps explain legal rules that might otherwise
seem barbaric.

2. Legal Authorization for Killing Pirates
Consistent with the view that pirates on the seas were men outside the
protection of international and domestic law, and therefore could and should
be extirpated like wild beasts, a myriad of legal authorities—statutes of Parliament, colonial charters, royal proclamations, royal commissions, patents,
and other instructions directed to naval and other executive officials—
directly or indirectly authorized the extrajudicial killing of pirates.
A statute of Parliament creating articles of war to govern the Royal Navy made it a capital crime, triable by court martial, for a naval captain or officer in “any fight or engagement” with “the Enemy Pirate or Rebells” to
171
fail to “do his utmost to take fire[,] kill[,] and endamage” the opponents.
Formal crown instructions to naval officers and other commanders further evidence the direction of lethal force against pirates and the lack of legal concern with killing them—though it was also frequently noted that captured pirates should be brought to trial. A commission issued by Henry VIII
in 1511 instructed the captain to use warships “to seize and subdue all and
singular such spoilers, pirates, exiles, and outlaws, wheresoever they shall
from time to time be found; and, if they cannot otherwise be seized, to destroy them,” with the prisoners delivered to commissioners of the Admiral172
ty. Elizabeth I in 1572 authorized the Lord High Admiral to seize pirates
infesting the “seas or rivers of this jurisdiction of the Admiraltye” so they
could be “tried and proved by justice and lawe,” but notes that “by fightinge
with them any one or mo[r]e of them maye happen to be maymed, hurte, or
173
slaine for their resistance.” In 1577, Elizabeth issued a warrant to the warden of the Cinque Ports noting the problem of “pyrats and sea rovers haunt-

171.
13 Car. 2 c. 9, § 12 (1661). These articles were based on an interregnum statute that
had been drafted by the judges of Admiralty, and amended only slightly by Parliament, and so
reflected expert opinion about the state of the law. See Reginald Acland, The Naval Articles of
War, 3 J. COMP. LEG. & INT’L L. 190, 195–98 (1921). The 1661 articles quoted above were in
force until 1749, when the entire set of articles were amended and re-enacted by Parliament.
See id. at 198–200 (noting the substantive amendments between 1661 and 1749). The specific
references to fighting and killing pirates, enemies, and rebels were replaced by directions that
an officer must do his “utmost to take or destroy every Ship which it shall be his Duty to engage.” 18 Geo. 2 c. 33, § 12 (1744). Pirates were mentioned in two articles, requiring naval
officers to chase them vigorously and refrain from cowardly surrender to them. Id. §§ 13, 15.
172.
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, supra note 144, at
146, 147 (appointing John Hopton to command a squadron against pirates).
173.
Id. at 191, 194–95.
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ing . . . the narrow seas and streames thereof,” and directing him to “arme
and sett fourth . . . shippes furnished with maryners, souldiers, gonners, and
174
other persons . . . to purge and clear the sea coasts of such evill persons.”
James I in 1609 authorized the High Admiral to issue commissions of admiralty to masters and commanders of armed vessels to seize “pyraticall
ships,” their men being “committed to safe custodie . . . [to] suffer the payne
of our lawes for their pyracie,” but noted that it may “soe fall out that by
fighting with them any one or more of them may be maymed, hurte, or
175
slayne.”
In 1684, Charles II authorized a captain sailing for the Royal African
Company to “seize and destroy all such pyrates, freebooters, and sea rovers,
which he shall meet” within the geographic limits of the company’s char176
ter. That same year, Charles II wrote to the governor and magistrates of
Massachusetts Bay colony, stating:
In consequence of the ravages of pirates in the territory of the King
of Spain, we have thought it fit, for the encouragement of the amity
that exists between us and his Spanish Majesty, to give orders for
the suppression of pirates, and that you give no succour nor assistance to any, and especially not to one called Thomas Pain, who,
with five vessels under the command of Captain Breha, has lately
sailed to Florida. Such pirates you will exterminate, so far as in you
177
lies, as a race of evildoers and enemies of mankind.
In 1686, the lieutenant governor of the colony of Jamaica issued written
orders to a Royal Navy captain to cruise to “the Gulf of Samana . . . where
Banister, the pirate may be expected to be found, and search all likely places
178
for him, destroying all pirates.” Similar directions were given to other na179
val captains based at that colony. In 1688, James II proclaimed that pirates
who surrendered would receive a pardon for past crimes but those who do
not “shall be pursued with the utmost Severity, and with the greatest Rigour
that may be, until they and every of them be utterly Suppressed and De-

174.
Id. at 216, 216–17. The Cinque Ports were seacoast towns in Kent and Sussex.
175.
Id. at 377, 377–78.
176.
Id. at 112–13.
177.
CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
1681–85, at 617–18 (J.W. Fortescue ed., London, Eyre & Spottiswood 1898) (entry 1634).
178.
CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
1685–88, at 186 (J.W. Fortescue ed., London, HM’s Stationery Office 1899) (entry 661).
179.
See id. at 160 (directing the captain to take two Royal Naval vessels to find a pirate
“and endeavour to take or destroy him”) (entry 598); id. at 419 (“Ordering him to sail to Providence to take the pirate Woollerly, and thence to Havanna to demand the surrender of the
pirate Bear, or failing that, to seek him out and destroy him.”) (entry 1405).
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180

stroyed.” He previously authorized Robert Holmes, in command of a naval fleet, to suppress piracy in the Americas either “by force” or by offering
181
individual pardons.
In 1698, the Council of Trades and Plantations (later the Board of
Trade) advised the Privy Council that a Captain Warren, leading a naval
squadron to the East Indies, should be granted power “to seize on the persons, ships and goods of the pirates, and in case of resistance to pursue and
destroy or take them by land or sea . . . . Any pirates who will not voluntarily submit must be attacked by land or sea, their persons, ships, etc., and
182
their fortifications and refuges destroyed.” Later in 1698, the governor of
the Bahamas commissioned the captain of an armed vessel to apprehend and
183
deliver up “the notorious pirate Kelly,” “or in any ways to destroy him.”
Authorization to kill pirates on sight continued to issue into the eighteenth century. In 1700, the Council of Virginia offered a reward “for the
184
apprehension or killing of any pirate.” In 1701, the new governor of the
185
Bahamas commissioned a fighting ship to “seize and destroy all pirates.”
Admiralty instructions to Royal Navy captains early in the century directed
them to “use your best endeavours to take, burn, sink, or otherwise destroy”
186
pirate vessels. And in 1753, the Admiralty instructed a Royal Navy captain dispatched to Africa that he should seek out pirates and use his “utmost
187
endeavours to take or destroy them.”
Colonial charters for American settlements offer additional evidence
that pirates could lawfully be exterminated. A number of colonial charters,
such as the 1663 charter for the colony of Carolina (granted by Charles II),
contained a clause authorizing the proprietor, in order to protect against
“sa[]vages . . . other enemies, pirates, and robbers,” to
make war and pursue the enemies and robbers aforesaid, as well by
sea as by land, yea, even without the limits of the said province,
and by God’s assistance to vanquish and take them, and being tak-

180.
King James II, A Proclamation for the More Effectual Reducing and Suppressing of
Pirates and Privateers in America (Jan. 20, 1688), in BRITISH ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS
RELATING TO AMERICA, 1603–1783, at 140, 142 (Clarence S. Brigham ed., 1911).
181.
Id. at 140–41.
182.
CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 27
OCTOBER 1697–31 DECEMBER 1698, at 410–11 (J.W. Fortescue ed., 1905) (entry 788).
183.
CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
1699, at 53 (Cecil Headlam ed., 1908) (entry 82-I).
184.
CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
1700, at 239 (Cecil Headlam ed., 1910) (entry 405).
185.
CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
JAN.–DEC. 1, 1701, at 17 (Cecil Headlam ed., 1912) (entry 25 vi).
186.
PETER EARLE, THE PIRATE WARS 185–86 (2003).
187.
THE BARRINGTON PAPERS 99–109 (D. Bonner-Smith ed., 1937).
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en, to put them to death by the law of war, or to save them at their
188
pleasure.
Other colonial charters for the Americas did not list pirates specifically, but
authorized the government to
encounter, expulse, expell and resist, by force of armes, as well by
sea as by lande, and also to kill, slay and destroy, by all fitting
wayes . . . all and every such person and persons as shall, at any
tyme hereafter, attempt or enterprize the destruction, invasion, det189
riment or annoyance of the said inhabitants.
Another common provision in charters stated that those committing
robberies and other acts of hostility on sea or land would be given a chance
to make restitution and, if they did not, declared “out of our [the king’s] Allegiance and Protection; And that it shall be lawful and free, for all Princes,
190
and others to pursue with hostility the said offender.”
Colonial officers received instructions regarding pirates that were similar to the message of the 1661 articles of war governing the Royal Navy.
For instance, a 1693 act of the province of New York directed government
officers who learned of the presence of “pyrates” to raise “well Armed
Men” to seize and jail the pirates, “and in case of any Resistance, or refusal
to yield Obedience to their Majesties Authority, it shall be lawful to Kill or
191
Destroy such Person or Persons.”
In sum, the law of nations and English domestic law allowed the English government and private persons to summarily kill pirates encountered
on the high seas, and the Crown and Parliament deployed that legal authority by repeatedly ordering or authorizing the killing of pirates. But many legal authorities suggested that criminal process—rather than extrajudicial
killing—was required if pirates were seized on or near English shores, within easy reach of due process. In practice, the English government did frequently try rather than summarily kill captured pirates. In those trials, a jury
was used if the trial occurred under the statutes of Henry VIII, while a
bench trial only was available if trial occurred on shipboard or in the colonies under the statute of William III. Both modes of proceeding were considered lawful.

188.
KING CHARLES II, CHARTER OF CAROLINA para. 15 (1663); accord KING CHARLES
I, CHARTER OF MARYLAND para. 12 (1632); KING CHARLES II, CHARTER OF PENNSYLVANIA
para. 14 (1681).
189.
KING CHARLES II, CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATION
para. 8 (1663).
190.
KING JAMES I, CHARTER OF VIRGINIA para. 16 (1606); accord KING CHARLES II,
CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATION para. 9 (1663); KING CHARLES
II, CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT para. 7 (1662).
191.
PROVINCE OF NEW-YORK, AN ACT FOR RESTRAINING AND PUNISHING
PRIVATEERS AND PYRATES 3 (1693), microformed on Early American Imprints, Series I No.
834 (Readex).
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II. Explaining England’s Widespread Use of
Criminal Trials for Pirates
Notwithstanding the clarity with which the law of nations and English
domestic law allowed the killing of pirates encountered on the high seas—
as well as those who resisted apprehension, wherever located—in practice,
many pirates were captured and transported to criminal trial, either at Admiralty Sessions in England or in specially-constituted colonial vice-admiralty
courts. What explains this observed practice, if not a view of global due
process?
Although some factors favoring a criminal justice approach to piracy
were always present, other factors depended on the historical era. Generally
speaking, in earlier English history, the state was weak and the English government did not always view piracy negatively. In fact, important government officials, including, at times, the monarch, supported pirates in some
circumstances as a source of revenue and a cost-effective way to harass enemies. As the central English state matured, it came to view piracy as an
unmitigated evil. Protection of lawful commerce, under the aegis of a globespanning Royal Navy, demanded the extirpation of piracy. Colonials in the
Americas took a long time to fall into line. It was only when London was
able to exert effective control over colonial government that official toleration of piracy by some colonial officials was finally stamped out. There is
no bright line in time between these two eras. I have made a rough division
according to the monarchical houses that sat on the English throne.

A. The Tudor and Stuart Eras (circa 1485 to 1688)
There were a myriad of factors supporting a primarily law enforcement
approach to piracy suppression. Domestic law played a role, but a narrower
one than Chapman suggests. Many suspected pirates were captured on
192
land. In the pre-modern era, the English navy was not large, except during
wartime. But in wartime, the navy was busy with its military enemies. The
geographic area over which pirates operated was vast, making it inherently
193
difficult to find and detain pirates on the high seas. So naval captures on
the high seas could not have been a large percentage of total captures of pirates. And, of course, English law understood that alleged criminals captured on land in England or in English colonies were entitled to trial with
due process according to the standing laws of the land. This obvious and
uncontroversial rule explains many piracy trials.

192.
See, e.g., ROBERT C. RITCHIE, CAPTAIN KIDD AND THE WAR AGAINST THE
PIRATES 181–82 (1986) (capturing Captain William Kidd on land); DURSTON, supra note 41,
at 203 (arresting pirate Philip Roche on land); 2 BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE:
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 1660–1730, at 289–90 (Joel Baer ed., 2007) [hereinafter
BRITISH PIRACY] (catching seven pirates on land); id. at 1–2 (capturing pirate Charles Vane
captured on land).
193.
EARLE, supra note 186, at 183–84.
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Moreover, English pirates often worked just off the coast, rather than
194
ranging more widely afield. If a suspected pirate or other criminal was
captured near the seacoast of England or an English colony, and thus within
easy reach of the criminal justice system, a number of authorities held that
195
the law required disposition via criminal trial. English monarchs claimed
196
territorial jurisdiction over the surrounding “British Seas,” and so criminal
trials for pirates captured on the waters around England could likely be
viewed as “domestic.” Disposition of these accused pirates via the criminal
197
justice system thus would not provide evidence for Chapman’s claim that
due process was understood to be truly global.
But many pirates captured on the high seas were also processed through
criminal courts rather than being killed in combat or summarily executed
after capture. One modern commentator offers that it was “very rare” for
198
captured English pirates to be summarily executed by the government.
That seems correct based on my research. The intentional killing of pirates
in combat actions, when capture might well have been possible if different
tactics were used, seems, however, to have been common.
We must ask why the legal right of summary execution was so rarely
exercised and why the English government used the criminal justice system
as a first-order tool for dealing with captured pirates. There were many reasons sounding in policy, culture, morality, and law why the government preferred the criminal justice system to handle suspected pirates. Chapman’s
global due process view was not among those reasons, however. As a general matter, it is not sound to assume that a sense of legal compulsion must
have been the cause when we observe the government treating persons with
fairness or mercy. There are many non-legal reasons to treat other human
beings with fairness and mercy. Piracy suppression by the English government provides a useful example of this.
For hundreds of years, there was a complex and ambivalent relationship
between pirates and the English state. Coming out of the medieval period,
the seas were still a largely lawless place, and it was unclear whether rob199
bing foreigners on the high seas was actually illegal. Even after the English state matured and began to define piracy against foreigners (and Eng-

194.
See, e.g., N.A.M. RODGER, THE SAFEGUARD OF THE SEA: A NAVAL HISTORY OF
BRITAIN, 660–1649, at 348 (1997); DAVID CHILDS, TUDOR SEA POWER: FOUNDATION OF
GREATNESS 184 (2009).
195.
See sources cited supra notes 163–165.
196.
RUBIN, supra note 144, at 96, 103; THOMAS WEMYSS FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY
OF THE SEA: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CLAIMS OF ENGLAND TO THE DOMINION OF
THE BRITISH SEAS 18–20 (1911).
197.
DURSTON, supra note 41, at 200 (“In the first century or so of the [Admiralty] sessions’ existence most cases [of piracy] originated in waters immediately around the British
Isles.”).
198.
Id. at 25.
199.
See RODGER, supra note 194, at 79, 115–16.

422

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 39:385

lishmen) as a crime, it was still openly practiced by the English, especially
against foreign victims who were not co-religionists, and often with either
200
the tacit permission or active support of English government officials.
Francis Drake’s blatant and extraordinarily lucrative piracy against the
Spanish, for example, was supported by Queen Elizabeth and some highly201
placed officials. Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,
members of the Privy Council, judges of the Admiralty court, and many
other officials in England invested in and otherwise profited from piracy.
Government officials in the overseas colonies, using distance to their advantage, supported pirates to a greater degree, even into the eighteenth cen202
tury when the main English state turned decisively against it. Piracy
against English targets was frowned upon, however, and often harshly pun203
ished by the government.
204
There was also a fine line between piracy and privateering. The latter
was the practice, during war, of the government giving commissions to private parties to outfit men-of-war to prey on the seaborne commerce of the
205
enemy. This was piracy if there were no government license. Privateers
often exceeded their commissions, however, by seizing neutral or friendly
206
shipping too. And the English often took the controversial position that
peace in Europe did not apply “beyond the line” in the Spanish West Indies,
allegedly making privateering lawful there at all times. In addition to licensing this private sea raiding, England extensively used pirates and privateers
207
to supplement its naval fleets during wartime. Private armed ships were
208
pivotal to the repulse of the Spanish Armada in 1588.
Thus, “pirates” were not a unified category of men, and were certainly
not all considered the “enemies of the human race,” as described by legal
commentators. In fact, many individuals who committed acts that modern
minds would consider barbaric, brute piracy were among the richest and
209
most respected English gentlemen in their communities.

200.
See HANNA, supra note 27, at 10–11; RODGER, supra note 194, at 147–48, 182,
195, 199–200, 343–45.
201.
See HANNA, supra note 27, at 40–44; RODGER, supra note 194, at 243–45.
202.
See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 40, 55, 65–66, 145–57, 217–20, 237–39;
RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 12–14, 38; RODGER, supra note 194, at 347–49.
203.
See HANNA, supra note 27, at 48–49.
204.
See, e.g., Benton, supra note 29, at 706–13.
205.
DURSTON, supra note 41, at 204–05; RODGER, supra note 194, at 199–200.
206.
DURSTON, supra note 41, at 206–07; RODGER, supra note 194, at 199; Benton, supra note 29, at 706–13.
207.
See, e.g., JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH
STATE, 1688–1783, at 10–11 (1988); HANNA, supra note 27, at 40, 112–16, 123, 214, 225,
245; RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 16, 29–30.
208.
See HANNA, supra note 27, at 40.
209.
See RODGER, supra note 194, at 343–45.
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Given the ambivalent views about pirates held by the government and
population for hundreds of years, it made sense to process captured pirates
through the criminal justice system rather than slaughtering them outright at
the point of capture. Piracy was a capital crime, without the benefit of cler210
gy. It was mostly Englishmen who were tried for piracy in English courts,
so these were co-nationals at least, and sometimes even friends and neighbors of the magistrates, judges, and jurors. Public opinion would have wanted guilt to be fairly determined before the ultimate penalty of death was imposed. Using the criminal justice system also allowed exercises of discretion
in favor of mercy for those pirates whose actions were considered perhaps
technically illegal but not wrongful by the government or the local popula211
tion. Juries could, and often did, refuse to convict. Judges could release an
accused for a variety of legal reasons. The crown could pardon. If pirates
were summarily destroyed by their captors, none of this discretion would
have been possible.
When foreign nationals committed piracies, diplomatic considerations
came to the fore. For reasons of state, English monarchs often preferred to
treat foreign pirates mildly—using a catch and release policy, with notice to
212
the foreign sovereign so as to reap diplomatic benefits. If punishment of
the foreign pirate was deemed necessary, word could be sent to his home
government that he would be treated fairly, and niceties arranged for the de213
tainee, such as bail under the care of his sovereign’s diplomat in England.
None of this centralized policy calibration would have been possible if pirates were summarily executed in lieu of capture.
In addition, pirates were tough and skilled mariners and thus very useful
men. A historian dubbed English piracy based in the West Country “the
214
School of English Seamen.” Oftentimes, pirates had formerly sailed on
behalf of England, either in the naval service, as privateers during wartime,
or against foreign pirates, and might do so again. Thus the crown could give
royal pardons to pirates on the condition, or at least with the hope, that they
215
would choose to serve the state. This could only happen if accused pirates

210.
Offenses at Sea Act of 1536, 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 3; see also DURSTON, supra note
41, at 15–19 (discussing this fact).
211.
DURSTON, supra note 41, at 113–15.
212.
See, e.g., Letter from Henry VIII to Stephen Gardiner (Oct. 5, 1537), in [12 Part 2]
LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, OF THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII, supra note
82, at 292, 293 (1891) (entry 832).
213.
See, e.g., [12 Part 1] LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, OF THE
REIGN OF HENRY VIII, supra note 82, at 390 (entry 866).
214.
See HANNA, supra note 27, at 49.
215.
See id. at 16, 45, 49, 54 n.58, 126, 158. For an example of a monarch seeking to
turn pirates into sailors of the Royal Navy, see King Edward VI, Ordering Arrest of Irish Pirates (Jan. 1549), in 1 TUDOR ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 437, 437 (Paul L. Hughes & James
Francis Larkin eds., 1964) (stating that “the honest mariners, soldiers, and others” who served
as pirate crews would be pardoned if they turned themselves in to the Admiral or the Lord
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were proceeded against via the criminal justice system rather than killed extrajudicially on the high seas.
Financial incentives might also have provided some motivation for
crown officials to prefer a criminal justice approach to piracy. Convicted
pirates suffered death with no benefit of clergy, and their lands and goods
216
were forfeit. The Lord High Admiral received as personal income these
217
forfeitures and any fines from criminal convictions of pirates. At first the
admiral, and then later the crown, received convicted pirates’ property, as
218
well as any property stolen by pirates that was not claimed by victims.
Treaties provided another reason to resort to courts of law to punish
non-English pirates captured on the seas. In a 1654 treaty, for instance, England and Sweden promised that neither “the subjects of either state,” nor
“their ships or effects” would be arrested except “according to due form of
219
220
law.” This appeared in treaties with other countries as well. Treaties
promised that subjects of each nation would have access to the courts of the
221
other, and that justice under law would be done to them. In bilateral treaties, England also promised to bring its nationals who engaged in piracy to
222
justice. Other English treaties promised that naval commanders “will not
molest or injure the subjects” of the other nation, and “if they shall do otherwise, they shall be liable to answer for it in their persons and estates, and
shall therein stand bound until just satisfaction and compensation shall be
223
made.”

Deputy of Ireland, and “as many of them as be willing to serve shall be received into wages
and serve in his highness’ ships.”).
216.
See VINER, supra note 164, at 352; HALE, supra note 116, at 354; AN ABRIDGMENT
OF SEVERAL ACTS AND CLAUSES OF ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO THE TRADE AND
NAVIGATION OF GREAT BRITAIN 22, 24 (London, John Baskett 1739).
217.
See DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, supra note
144, at 370, 444–45; 1 THE POPULAR ENCYCLOPEDIA 35 (Glasgow, Blackie & Son 1841).
218.
VINER, supra note 164, at 349.
219.
Treaty of Peace and Amity, Eng.-Swed., art. 5, Apr. 11, 1654, 3 Consol. T.S. 257.
220.
Treaty of Peace and Commerce, Eng.-Den., art. 26, July 11, 1670, 11 Consol. T.S.
1670.
221.
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Eng.-Spain, arts. 1, 23, May 13, 1667, 10 Consol.
T.S. 63. To the same effect, see Treaty of Commerce, Eng.-Neth., art. 15, Feb. 17, 1668, 10
Consol. T.S. 441. The 1667 treaty with Spain was applied to Sicily in 1713. Convention Respecting the Commerce of Sicily and Great Britain, Gr. Brit.-Savoy, para. 3, Mar. 8, 1713, 27
Consol. T.S. 397. And the 1667 treaty was reaffirmed in 1715. See Treaty of Peace and Commerce, Gr. Brit.-Spain, art. 5, Dec. 14, 1715, 29 Consol. T.S. 369.
222.
Treaty of Peace, Alliance, and Commerce, Eng.-Den., art. 19, Feb. 13, 1661, 6
Consol. T.S. 233 (promising that each party “shall use means that the foresaid pirates and
robbers, and their partners and abettors, may be apprehended, and suffer condign punishment”). To the same effect, see Treaty of Peace and Commerce, supra note 220, art. 29; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 221, art. 4; Treaty of Peace, Good Correspondence and
Neutrality in America, Eng.-Fr., art. 14, Nov. 6, 1686, 18 Consol. T.S. 83.
223.
Treaty of Peace and Commerce, supra note 220, art. 35. To the same effect, see
Treaty of Commerce, supra note 221, art. 22; Treaty of Peace and Alliance, Eng.-Neth., art. 3,
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Although these treaty promises were embodied in specific bilateral
agreements, they also extended to England’s relations with other nonsignatory nations because of “most favored nation” clauses. An example of
a typical most favored nation clause, in a bilateral treaty with Spain, promised that the subjects of each country would “enjoy . . . in all places whatsoever, the same privileges, securities, liberties, and immunities, whether they
concern their persons or trade, with all the beneficial clauses and circumstances which have been granted, or shall hereafter be granted” by either
224
monarch in other treaties. Thus England was bound to treat Spanish nationals according to the highest level of liberties and immunities it had
promised to the subjects of any other nation.
This web of treaty promises by England meant that international law
and diplomatic considerations favored the use of criminal process for accused pirates in many instances, just as domestic policy considerations did
also.

B. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89
Starting in the latter part of the seventeenth century, the English state
grew in size, power, and expertise and came to understand that commerce
rather than marauding was the key to national prosperity. Simultaneously,
the central government started to clamp down on piracy and other kinds of
225
privatized violence, even that directed against foreigners. The English navy was greatly expanded at about the same time, and the government started
to use it extensively to protect merchant shipping from pirates and foreign
226
privateers. Using the criminal justice system as the mainstay of antipiracy efforts continued to make good sense under this new regime.
Piracy trials allowed the government to promote a deterrence objective
227
by making an example of the convicted. Pirates convicted in England
were, by tradition, hanged on the mudflats at Wapping, situated on the
Thames a mile down river from the Tower of London. Hanging occurred
between the high and low water marks, an area within the jurisdiction of the
Admiralty. After death, the bodies were chained to a stake until the tide
covered them three times. The bodies of notorious pirates were often then
removed, covered with pitch or sometimes wrapped in chains to preserve
the form of the body for a time. These bodies would be displayed publicly

¶ 37, July 31, 1667, 10 Consol. T.S. 231; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 221, art.
4; Treaty of Peace, Eng.-Fr., art. 16, Nov. 3, 1655, 4 Consol. T.S. 1; Treaty of Peace, Good
Correspondence and Neutrality in America, supra note 222, arts. 11–12.
224.
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 221, art. 38. To the same effect, see
Treaty of Peace and Commerce, supra note 220, arts. 8, 40.
225.
See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 222–50; RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 147–49.
226.
See, e.g., RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 155–59.
227.
See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 134 (noting English government awareness of
the deterrent value of public executions of convicted pirates).
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on gibbets at various places on the coast to warn sailors about the conse228
quences of resorting to piracy. This was more effective publicity in the
service of deterrence than it would be if pirates were killed on the high seas
far from public notice.
The central English government also saw criminal trials, which would
publicize the brutality of piracy, as a way to harden public perceptions
229
against it and so enlist support in the anti-piracy campaign. Trials of pirates were extensively covered in the press, and many books and pamphlets
230
based on the testimony were published.
Bringing state power to bear through the criminal justice system was
understood to be a powerful way to send a message to foreign governments
with whom England desired to maintain peaceful relations. Diplomats representing foreign nations frequently complained to the English government
about piratical attacks by Englishmen, and the Crown often responded by
proclaiming that the perpetrators were pirates and directing vigorous efforts
231
to try and execute them. Failing to punish English pirates criminally who
attacked friendly foreigners would have been considered a serious breach of
232
England’s duties under the law of nations. Thus, criminal prosecution was
a potent diplomatic message.
Colonial officials also sent messages via criminal trials of accused pirates. Once the central government began vigorously cracking down on colonial governmental support of piracy, it became important for colonial
leaders to show that the message was received. Colonial governors sent captured pirates back to England for trial as a visible sign to their superiors that
233
they were taking vigorous action against the problem, or held and publi234
cized trials in their colony for the same purpose.
Thus, during both periods of England’s relationship with piracy—an
earlier period in which pirates were sometimes supported rather than proscribed, and a later period in which piracy was unequivocally treated by the
state as an outrage to be strictly suppressed—there were multiple reasons
for the government to prefer a criminal justice approach. There is no basis,

228.
The foregoing paragraph is based on JOWITT, supra note 90, at 21–22; LINCOLN,
supra note 163, at 34–40; RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 1–2, 228.
229.
See HANNA, supra note 27, at 11, 240–41.
230.
Id. at 240–41. For examples of such pamphlets, books, and articles, see the documents reproduced in 1–4 BRITISH PIRACY, supra note 192.
231.
See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 180, 239. For centuries, diplomatic correspondence by English officials and by foreign diplomats concerning England is littered with foreign
government complaints about pirates and English promises to find and punish them. See, e.g.,
Letter from Eustace Chapuys to Charles V (Jan. 30, 1532), in LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC, OF THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII, supra note 82, at 362 (entry 762).
232.
See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and
the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 478–81 (2011).
233.
See, e.g., RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 159.
234.
See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 120, 134.
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therefore, to assume that a view of global liberty under law must have been
the causal driver for the observed phenomenon of widespread and preferential use of criminal law.

III. The Law of the United States
Chapman argues that Americans inherited a concept of global due process from England and embodied it in their Constitution, in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As discussed above, Chapman claims that
English due process required that anyone, anywhere in the world, suspected
of conduct that constituted a domestic crime must be proceeded only according to the course of the common law and other standing law of the land,
including trial by jury. The only deviation, Chapman claims, was that trial
before the bench (rather than jury) was authorized during the reign of William III in admiralty courts held in the American colonies or other overseas
locations. But, according to Chapman, Americans rejected this and reverted
to the original, strict view of due process.
The previous sections show that there was no such view of global due
process held by the English, at home or in the North American colonies.
Thus, post-independence Americans could not have inherited anything of
that sort. Instead, Americans inherited the view, based in international law
and English domestic law, that pirates on the high seas were outside the protection of the law and could lawfully be killed, either in battle or by summary execution after capture.
Chapman is correct that England had a practice of trying many pirates
captured on the seas in regular criminal courts, rather than summarily killing
them. He is also correct that Americans continued this practice. The Constitution authorized Congress to “define and punish piracies and felonies
235
committed on the high seas,” and from the 1790 Crimes Act onward, the
236
United States had a federal statutory crime of piracy. There were many
federal court piracy prosecutions, of both American citizens and foreigners,
237
during the Founding and Early Republic eras.
But this observed practice, standing alone, is not evidence that Chapman’s view of due process existed. Americans, like the English, had many
reasons based in policy, morality, expediency, international law, and international relations to use the criminal justice approach for pirates. We must
see some direct evidence, then, showing that frequent resort to the criminal
model was driven by legal understandings of due process of the type Chapman suggests. Chapman presents only one piece of evidence of this kind—

235.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
236.
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1819,
ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14.
237.
See, e.g., DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS AND CRIMINALS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801–1829 (1985).
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an 1822 report of a House of Representatives committee. As discussed below, the report does not mean what Chapman thinks it does.
In theory, Americans might have accepted Chapman’s view even
though their mother country rejected it. Many Americans had come to believe over the long decades of revolutionary ferment and constitutionmaking that fundamental liberties, including the jury, should be inviolate.
And there was an emerging notion in the founding era that governmental
acts in violation of fundamental liberties were void, and might be declared
238
so by the courts. The Americans’ written constitution guaranteed a jury in
239
criminal cases, in Article III of the original, un-amended document. And
the Bill of Rights added additional protection for the criminal jury and new
240
protection for the grand jury and civil jury. But despite all this, the evidence discussed below shows that Americans did not think that their new
and improved version of due process required that pirates on the high seas
be suppressed only with criminal trials. The only change from English practice was that Americans insisted that the jury must be used if criminal trials
for piracy were to occur.

A. Background Understandings
The United States was not, of course, a legal blank slate when it declared independence in 1776, much less in 1788, when the Constitution was
adopted. New law was overlaid on the pre-existing British system, in which
the new republic was nurtured. Thus, the English practice and law, discussed above, which treated pirates on the high seas as outside the protection of the law and subject to extrajudicial killing, was the system that the
United States inherited. A lot of the piracy occurred in and around the
Americas, and thus colonial administrators in what would become the United States were involved in creating many of the precedents about the lawful
241
extermination of pirates that were described above. Specific English legal
authorities, which conveyed these legal understandings about pirates, were
well known in America. Parliamentary statutes, royal proclamations, important decisions of the Privy Council, and other significant government
documents were available in the United States. Legal treatises announcing
the rule that pirates could be lawfully killed were also available to Americans. We know that Molloy’s popular treatise, for example, was available
because it was frequently cited in litigation in U.S. courts, including in the
242
Supreme Court. Blackstone was an indispensable resource for American

238.
See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 455 (2005).
239.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
240.
Id. amends. V, VI, VII.
241.
See, e.g., supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
242.
See, e.g., McDonough v. Dannery, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188, 198 (1796) (opinion of
Cushing, J.); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 38 (1800) (argument of counsel); Blaine v.
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lawyers. The works of Viner, Hawkins, Hale, and Jacob’s law dictionary
243
and Lex Mercatoria—all cited above—were also in wide use.
Important indigenous American legal authorities reiterated the message
that it was lawful to kill pirates on the high seas. For example, the influential treatises of James Kent and William Alexander Duer both stated that
“[e]very nation has a right to attack and exterminate them [pirates] without
244
any declaration of war.” Kent also wrote that a pirate “is reputed to be out
245
of the protection of all laws and privileges.”
Foreign writers who had significant influence on American law likewise taught that it was lawful to summarily kill pirates. Emer de Vattel, the
Swiss authority on the law of nations, wrote that “the depredations of pirates” are a kind of “illegitimate and informal war[],” justifying a captor in
246
summarily hanging them. Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, another Swiss author
who was widely consulted and cited in early America, wrote that pirates
247
were an “enemy” whom anyone could “justly destroy.” The German jurist
Samuel Pufendorf, following Grotius, wrote that “Pirates are not . . . lawful
Enemies, but should be look’d on as the common Adversaries of Mankind,”
and since they operate in places (the high seas) “that are not subject to any
determinate Court of Judicature,” not only may the government attack them
under “the Right of War” but “every Man may draw his Sword against
248
them.”

Ship Charles Carter, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 328, 330 (1808) (argument of counsel); United States
v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 155 (1820) (argument of the U.S. Attorney General).
243.
See, e.g., United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 481 (1827) (citing
HAWKINS, supra note 134, and HALE, supra note 116); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 159 n.4, 161 n.6, 163 n.8 (1820) (citing HAWKINS, supra note 134, and VINER,
supra note 164); Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 328 (1815) (citing VINER,
supra note 164); M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 310 (1805) (argument of
counsel citing HALE, supra note 116); Wilson v. Lenox, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 194, 210 (1803)
(argument of counsel citing JACOB, DICTIONARY, supra note 165); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 133, 160 (1795) (Iredell, J., citing LEX MERCATORIA, supra note 165).
244.
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 172 (New York, O. Halstead
1826); WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, OUTLINES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 148 (New York, Collins & Hannay 1833).
245.
KENT, supra note 244, at 174.
246.
EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 507–08 (Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758). On Vattel’s influence in America, see Thomas H.
Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1061–67 (2002); Brian Richardson, The Use of Vattel in the American
Law of Nations, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 547, 548 (2012).
247.
JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITIC LAW 274–75 (Petter
Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2006) (1751). On the influence of Burlamaqui in America, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 27–29 (50th anniversary ed. 2017); RAY FORREST HARVEY, JEAN JACQUES
BURLAMAQUI: A LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 79–175 (1937).
248.
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, at bk. III p.
220, bk. VIII pp. 168–69 (Oxford, L. Lichfield ed., 1703) (1672). On the influence of Pufen-
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In addition, the background understanding of a reciprocal link between
allegiance and protection, and the way citizenship and territorial location
interacted with that framework, was inherited in American law from Eng249
land. Thus, under U.S. law, noncitizens outside the country were presumptively outside the protections of domestic law, including the Constitu250
tion.

B. American Government Practice
After the United States built a small navy in the late 1790s and early
251
1800s, it was used extensively against pirates with apparently no expressed concern about the putative constitutional due process rights of those
attacked. Some of these anti-pirate military actions may best be understood
as war, and Chapman, along with most other globalist legal commentators,
concede that the Due Process Clause and other constitutional rights do not
252
apply to foreign enemies during wartime. But to sustain his ambitious thesis, Chapman needs to show that the Due Process Clause was understood to
limit the U.S. government’s choices—to prevent it from choosing to use violent measures such as military attack or summary execution on pirates, requiring instead that a criminal justice model be deployed. Chapman has not
shown this, and the historical record does not support it. This subsection addresses American government practice. Section V, which follows, will take
up directly the question of war versus law enforcement and whether funda-

dorf on the American Founding generation, see MARK WESTON JANIS, AMERICA AND THE
LAW OF NATIONS 1776–1939, at 24–25 (2010); BAILYN, supra note 247, at 27, 29, 43, 150.
249.
See Hamburger, supra note 115, at 1844–47; Kent, Global Constitution, supra note
7, at 499–505; Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 115, at 177.
250.
See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 485–505; Kent, Black Holes, supra
note 14, at 1036–37. This presumptive territoriality of fundamental legal protections coexisted, however, with an openness of American institutions to common law trespass recovery
when legal rights of citizens or noncitizens were invaded on the high seas or abroad. See Statutory Piracy, 2 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 19, 21 (1825). A Marshall Court case cited by some commentators to supposedly show that either common law actions against U.S. government officials were allowed for extraterritorial misconduct, or that the Constitution’s separation of
powers framework operated extraterritorially, Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804),
has been misread. The case concerned a kind of cross-claim allowed by the international law
of prize when a captor prosecuting a libel suit in a prize court was found to have wrongfully
detained a vessel. Application of the law of prize in federal courts occurred by implicit direction of the U.S. Constitution and statutes, not from a free-floating individual right under the
common law or Constitution. On the proper reading of Barreme, see Kent, Citizenship, supra
note 7, at 2119 n.14; Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security,
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1165 n.184, 1191 n.280 (2014).
251.
On the creation of the U.S. Navy, see JONATHAN R. DULL, AMERICAN NAVAL
HISTORY, 1607–1865: OVERCOMING THE COLONIAL LEGACY (2012); IAN W. TOLL, SIX
FRIGATES: THE EPIC HISTORY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE U.S. NAVY (2006); STEPHEN
HOWARTH, TO SHINING SEA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY, 1775–1998 (1999).
252.
See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 25, at 110–11; Chapman, supra note 15, at 377,
383–84.
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mental law constrained the government’s choice of which paradigm to employ.

1. Amelia Island, 1817
In 1817, the U.S. Navy cleared a “piratical establishment” from Amelia
Island in Spanish Florida, because “numerous violations of our laws had
been latterly committed by a combination of freebooters and smugglers of
253
various nations.” The United States was doing law enforcement via (potentially) lethal military force, something that Chapman claims was strictly
254
prohibited by the Due Process Clause. President Monroe stated that the
denizens of Amelia Island had made it “a channel for the illicit introduction
of slaves from Africa into the United States, an asylum for fugitive slaves
255
from the neighboring States, and a port for smuggling of every kind” —all
in violation of U.S. criminal statutes. The executive authorized the military
that, “if it should be found indispensably necessary, force must be used” to
256
clear out the pirate nest. The executive instructions and internal executive
257
258
branch communications, notes of cabinet deliberations, and debates in
Congress (primarily about the implications of the action at Amelia for U.S.
259
relations with Spain and rebelling former-Spanish colonies) reveal no
concern that due process was implicated in any of this.

2. Pirates in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, 1819-1828
Piracy plagued the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico during the second
and third decades of the nineteenth century. Spanish colonies in the new
world revolted in the first decade, claiming to be independent nations. These
revolutionary governments issued commissions to privateers, which immediately became a flimsy cover for piracy. Spain also licensed privateers in

253.
H.R. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUPPRESSION OF PIRATICAL
ESTABLISHMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 15-290 (1st Sess. 1818), reprinted in 4 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 132, 132–33 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834) (capitalization adjusted).
254.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 381, 389, 405.
255.
Message from President James Monroe to Congress (Dec. 2, 1817), in AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 130; see also Message from President James Monroe to Congress (Jan. 13, 1818), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 139 (stating that Amelia Island was the site of illegal smuggling and privateering); H.R. REP. NO. 15-290, at 132, 133–34 (finding that it was the “duty”
of the United States to stop this activity in order to secure commerce, stop attacks on neutral
shipping, and prevent violations of the United States’ “revenue and prohibitory laws.”).
256.
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 141; see also
id. at 143 (authorizing the use of force to clear the pirates and smugglers from Amelia Island).
257.
See AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 139–44.
258.
See 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 14–16, 20–21, 28–29 (Charles Francis
Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1875).
259.
31 ANNALS OF CONG. 403–04, 409–16 (1817); id. at 646–50 (1818).
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response. The breakdown of political and social order—both a cause and a
further effect of the revolutions—created a power vacuum which many
plain old pirates, not claiming any veneer of legality, exploited. After the
260
United States annexed Florida from Spain, the U.S. government became
even more concerned than before about terminating the pirate threat. The
fact that many U.S. citizens were engaging in either privateering-cumpiracy or straightforward piracy made the government’s interest even
261
stronger.
Records of the Navy’s response to this piracy show repeated instances
where life and property were taken with no semblance of judicial due process. Given the openness with which this was all discussed, in official government documents, presidential statements, congressional debates, and
newspapers, it seems inconceivable that any relevant actors subscribed to
Chapman’s due process thesis—i.e., that no person, including noncitizens
on the high seas or in foreign countries, who engaged in conduct made criminal by an act of Congress could be proceeded against except via judicial
process under the standing laws of the land.
Naval, congressional, and public attention were focused on the antipiracy campaigns when Captain David Porter—who was given the title
commodore, put in command of the U.S. Navy’s West Indies squadron from
1823–25, and charged with suppressing piracy—was arraigned on charges
of misconduct in 1825. Porter had insulted Spanish officials at Puerto Rico
whom he thought were conniving with pirates and was recalled to the United States and court-martialed. A contemporaneous naval court of inquiry
also examined his overall record in the West Indies. Despite the review and
publication of voluminous documents and testimony showing the life, limb,
and property of suspected pirates being taken without any due process, neither the civilian executive branch, the naval courts, Congress, nor the public
seemed to have any legal qualms.
Anti-pirate naval actions began before Porter arrived on the scene. Apparently acting under the 1790 Crimes Act, which made piracy a federal
crime, the U.S. Navy was attacking pirates in the Gulf of Mexico as early at
1814. A naval commandant wrote to the Secretary of the Navy of his duty,

260.
The treaty was signed in 1819 and effective in 1821. See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
261.
For the history summarized in the preceding paragraph, see CAITLIN FITZ, OUR
SISTER REPUBLICS: THE UNITED STATES IN AN AGE OF AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS (2017);
DAVID HEAD, PRIVATEERS OF THE AMERICAS: SPANISH AMERICAN PRIVATEERING FROM
THE UNITED STATES IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2015); JOHN CHARLES CHASTEEN,
AMERICANOS: LATIN AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE (2009); ARTHUR P.
WHITAKER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF LATIN AMERICA, 1800–1830
(1941); GARDNER W. ALLEN, OUR NAVY AND THE WEST INDIAN PIRATES (1929); FRANCIS
B.C. BRADLEE, PIRACY IN THE WEST INDIES AND ITS SUPPRESSION (1923).
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in reference to an attack on pirates on the Louisiana coast, to “destroy or
262
make prisoners of them and their leaders.”
In 1819, as piracy grew in scale and violence, Congress responded with
a two-pronged statute. On the one hand, there was a judicial due process approach. The crime of piracy was expanded somewhat, and the Navy was authorized to seize and bring into port for condemnation via judicial process
263
any vessels engaged in piracy. On the other hand, military force would be
used to destroy pirates and their vessels. The statute “authorized and requested” the president “to employ so many of the public armed vessels as,
in his judgment, the service may require, with suitable instructions to the
commanders thereof, in protecting the merchant vessels of the United States
264
and their crews from piratical aggression and depredations.”
As discussed below, under this authorization—which was renewed and
265
supplemented in subsequent years —the Navy killed many pirates, destroyed many suspected pirate vessels, frequently destroyed what they believed to be pirate property on shore (including on Spanish soil), and
brought large numbers of prisoners back to the United States for criminal
trial. Since the Due Process Clause protects property as well as life and liberty, both extrajudicial property destructions as well as killings of pirates are
evidence against Chapman’s view.
266
In fall 1819, it was reported that two U.S. revenue cutters attacked pirates off Louisiana and “the pirates lost six men killed. The remainder of her
267
crew, to the number of eighteen, were safely lodged in prison . . . .” In
November 1821, Lt. Lawrence Kearny, U.S. Navy, reported to the Secretary
of the Navy that he, in command of U.S. Brig. Enterprise off Cape Antonio,
Cuba, attacked pirates, captured one prisoner, and burned a captured “pirat-

262.
Letter from Master Commandant Daniel T. Patterson to William Jones, Sec’y of the
Navy (Sept. 10, 1814), as reprinted in JOSEPH GIBBS, ON THE ACCOUNT: PIRACY AND THE
AMERICAS, 1766–1835, at 84, 86 (2012).
263.
Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 78, §§ 2, 5, 3 Stat. 510, 512–14.
264.
Id. § 2.
265.
See Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, § 1, 3 Stat. 600 (extending the Act of 1819 for
two years and then further until the end of the next session of Congress); Act of Jan. 30, 1823,
ch. 7, 3 Stat. 721 (making permanent the Act of 1819); see also Act of Dec. 20, 1822, ch. 1, 3
Stat. 720, §§ 1–2 (authorizing the president to fit out and deploy additional naval vessels “for
the purpose of repressing piracy, and of affording effectual protection to the citizens and
commerce of the United States in the Gulf of Mexico, and the seas and territories adjacent,”
and appropriating money for that purpose).
266.
Revenue cutters were small sailing vessels designed for use near the coast to enforce U.S. revenue laws. See generally Greg Shelton, Note, The United States Coast Guard’s
Law Enforcement Authority Under 14 U.S.C. § 89: Smugglers’ Blues or Boaters’ Nightmare?,
34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 939–41 (1993) (explaining the development of the revenue
cutter service).
267.
A Pirate Taken, HAMPDEN PATRIOT (Springfield, Mass.), Oct. 21, 1819, at 2, reprinted in GIBBS, supra note 262, at 102, 103.
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268

ical Schooner[] . . . .” Two months later, Kearny was reported to have
269
“captured a piratical boat off Cape Antonio, landed, and burnt their huts.”
Also in January 1822, Lt. Ramage, commanding the Porpoise, reported to
his superiors that he landed soldiers on Cuba in search of reported pirates
who engaged the pirates in battle: “We took possession and burnt and destroyed their fleet, consisting of five vessels . . . . We also took three prisoners; the others fled to the woods. In the affair just mentioned the officers of
270
the expedition state that enemy’s loss to be severe.” Later that spring, a
U.S. Navy captain wrote that, from a station off Cuba, “I have taken and destroyed six piratical vessels, burnt two of their establishments, killed some
271
of their people, and have now some prisoners on board.” As discussed be272
low, many members of Congress expressed in floor statements that military force should be used to exterminate pirates, with no hint of hesitation
based on domestic legal concerns.
Although pirates and privateers were based on Spanish-owned islands,
including Cuba and Puerto Rico, and were understood to operate with the
support of some local merchants and Spanish government officials, the
United States was careful to respect Spanish sovereignty enough to avoid a
war. After delaying making this move for several years, the executive in
early 1823 authorized the Navy to enter Spanish territory to pursue pirates,
but required naval commanders to announce to local authorities that their
“sole object” was “aiding the local authorities” and “bring[ing] the offend273
ers to justice.” The Navy was instructed that, if it seized any pirates “on
land,” i.e., in Spanish territory, it must “deliver them over to the proper au274
thority to be dealt with according to law.” Nothing was said about the disposition of pirates captured on the high seas, suggesting that the mandated
use of the criminal justice system in this instance was driven by concerns
about international law and international relations, rather than any notion
that due process was global. The Navy’s general orders went further,
though, directing officers who captured suspected pirates to deliver them to
appropriate U.S. or Spanish authorities, without regard to where the capture
275
took place.

268.
Letter from Lt. Lawrence Kearny to Thompson, Sec’y of the Navy, (Nov. 12,
1821), reprinted in GIBBS, supra note 262, at 119.
269.
News, REPUBLICAN CHRON. (Ithaca, N.Y.), Jan. 30, 1822, at 3.
270.
BRADLEE, supra note 261, at 15, 16.
271.
Pirates and Piracy, CITY GAZETTE & COM. DAILY ADVERT. (Charleston, S.C.),
Apr. 3, 1822, at 2.
272.
See infra Section V.C.
273.
Instructions from Smith Thompson, Sec’y of the Navy, to Commodore David Porter (Feb. 1, 1823), in 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 502 (Ashbury Dickins & James C. Allen eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1858).
274.
Id.
275.
See General Instructions for Officers Commanding Cruising Vessels, Navy Department (C. 1823), IN MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY AND COURT
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In practice, however, the Navy under Porter from 1823––25 was brutal.
Porter testified to his understanding of the authority he had vis-à-vis pirates
encountered by his squadron in language familiar from old English treatises
and law dictionaries:
[P]irates are considered, by the laws of nations, the enemies of the
human race; and this being the case, it is the duty of all nations to
put them down . . . . [E]very pirate reduces himself to a state of nature, and defies all laws, and may be punished . . . . at discretion,
without any regard to law. . . . I offer the following quotation from
the Lex Mercatoria [at page] 184: ‘A piracy is attempted on the
ocean; if the pirates are overcome, the takers may immediately inflict a punishment by hanging them up at the main yard end, though
276
this is understood when no legal judgment may be obtained.’
Similarly, U.S. Navy (“USN”) Master Commandant Alexander Dallas testified that “[t]he particular object of this cruise was the destruction of all the
pirates, and piratical establishments, as well on the ocean as on shore, as we
277
could meet with.” And that is what happened.
In April 1823, Porter reported to the Secretary of the Navy that Lt.
Stribling, commanding U.S. naval vessels off Cuba, “ran along side of her
[the pirate vessel]” in a “sudden and effectual . . . attack,” and he “took possession of her, after a fire of ten minutes, in which time, all the [pirate]
crew, except the Captain and three others, one of whom is taken, were
278
killed—the pirate having time to fire his long gun only once.” One month
later, Porter wrote to the Secretary of the Navy quoting USN Captain Cassin, who was also operating off Cuba, reporting “the capture of a piratical
schooner and a very fine felucca; the destruction of one on shore, the burning of three schoolers in the Rio Palmas, and about a dozen of their [pi279
rates’] houses in the different establishments to leeward of Bahia Honda.”
Also in May 1823, USN Lt. Watson wrote to Porter, reporting that off Sig-

MARTIAL IN RELATION TO CAPTAIN DAVID PORTER 183 (Washington, Davis & Force 1825)
[hereinafter PORTER PROCEEDINGS] (“Whenever, therefore, you shall find any boats or vessels, the crews whereof have committed any actual violence, outrage, or depredation, upon
any vessels of the United States, or the citizens thereof . . . you will consider yourself authorized to subdue, seize, and taken them; and, unless on such capture, you shall be satisfied that
they were acting under some lawful authority, and not piratically, to send them in for adjudication.”).
276.
2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 419, 423 (Asbury Dickins & John
W. Forney eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860). Porter published this document as a
pamphlet in spring 1825. See Commodore Porter’s Defence, NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Baltimore,
Md.), June 11, 1825, at 231.
277.
PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 54 (testimony of Alexander Dallas).
278.
Letter from Commodore Porter to Sec’y of the Navy (April 16, 1823), in PORTER
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 204.
279.
Letter from Commodore Porter to Sec’y of the Navy (May 10, 1823), in PORTER
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 206.
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uapa, Cuba, “we pursued them [the pirates], and, after a short action, succeeded in taking both vessels, and effecting the almost total destruction of
their crews, amounting, as nearly as could be ascertained at the time, to 50
280
or 60 men; but, as we are since informed, to seventy or eighty.” The Porter court of inquiry later praised this “gallant action, peculiarly destructive
281
to the pirates.” Prisoners were taken, too. Some were delivered to Spanish
282
283
authorities, some returned to the United States for criminal trial, and
some were reportedly given to the British Navy’s anti-piracy squadron for
284
summary execution.
In June 1823, USN Lt. Thomas Newell wrote a report to his superiors
lamenting that his efforts to kill pirates on a Cuban shore with grapeshot and
canister from his vessel’s long gun were unsuccessful: “as for killing any of
them, it was impossible, for, on the approach of the ‘Ferret’ [the navy
schooner he commanded] they [the pirates] would completely secure them285
selves behind rocks and trees.” A bit later, a U.S. officer wrote to his su286
perior, Porter, noting a “brilliant achievement.” He reported to Porter that
the Navy attacked pirate vessels at sea near Matanzas, Cuba, and “commenced a destructive slaughter, killing them in the water and as they landed;
so exasperated were our men, that it was impossible for their officers to restrain them, and many [pirates] were killed after orders were given to grant
287
quarters. Twenty-seven dead were counted.” This letter especially—even
more than the other reports previously cited—is inconsistent with any notion that due process of law was applicable. At the end of 1823, fully aware
of incidents like the above because of reports to Washington from naval of-

280.
Letter from Lt. Commandant Watson to Commodore Porter (May 21, 1823), in
PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 302.
281.
PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 91.
282.
See Letter from Lt. Francis H. Gregory to Sec’y of the Navy (n.d.), in PORTER
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 143 (noting that the U.S. Navy placed 76 captured pirates
“safely lodged in jail, committed for piracy” in Cuba).
283.
See, e.g., United States v. Cartacho, 25 F. Cas. 312 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 14,738).
Manuel Cartacho was captured by Lt. Stribling of Porter’s West Indies squadron and sailed
into Norfolk, Virginia, to stand trial. See Norfolk, June 30, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, July 4,
1823, at 2.
284.
See KENNETH J. HAGAN, THIS PEOPLE’S NAVY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SEA
POWER 97 (1991). I have not been able to verify this claim by Hagan. If true, it seems to suggest a consciousness that summary execution of captured pirates by American officials would
be wrongful.
285.
BRADLEE, supra note 261, at 16; PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 282–
83.
286.
Destruction of Pirates, EASTON GAZETTE (Easton, Md.), Aug. 2, 1823, at 3.
287.
Id; see also News, NEW-HAMPSHIRE SENTINEL (Keene, N.H.), Aug. 22, 1823, at 3
(reporting that the U.S. Navy engaged two pirate vessels, and “[t]he number of the pirates is
stated at [from] 60 to 80, who, with the exception of nine, were either killed by our men, or
drowned in attempting to swim on shore. Five were desperately wounded and taken prisoners,
and have been sent by Com. Porter to the Gov. of Cuba for trial.”).
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ficers of the West Indies Squadron, the Secretary of the Navy instructed
Porter to “continue your exertions to repress piracy, and protect our com288
merce.” Porter’s year-end report to the Secretary recounted that he burnt
or otherwise destroyed all piratical vessels and land bases he encountered,
and while “[s]ome severity has been exercised while the battle lasted . . . the
289
result has been beneficial.”
The West Indies squadron was back in U.S. waters for part of 1824,
during which time Congress and the executive considered whether to blockade Puerto Rico or Cuba for anti-piracy purposes. No agreement could be
290
reached.
The year 1825 started with statements by Congress and President Monroe that are inconsistent with the due process thesis. The House Committee
on Naval Affairs released a report hoping that local officials in Puerto Rico
and Cuba will join “in earnest in the extirpation” of pirates, “these foes of
291
the human race.” The president, meanwhile, sent a message to Congress
requesting legislative authorization to engage in “reprisal on the private
property” of the inhabitants of Spanish islands that harbor pirates. To be
clear, the president was suggesting that the United States take or destroy the
private property of Spaniards—subjects of a country at peace with the United States—whose only offense was to reside on islands where pirates were
292
harbored by some in their community. This should have been seen as flagrantly illegal if a global due process view was held by anyone at that time.
Down in the Caribbean, in early spring 1825, the Navy attacked a “pi293
ratical sloop” and killed two or three pirates near Puerto Rico. A bit later,
a naval officer reported to the Secretary of the Navy that they pursued a
suspected pirate vessel, “an action commenced,” and two pirates were killed
and five or six wounded, with those escaping to shore in Puerto Rico being

288.
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:
THE ORIGINS 372 (1976).
289.
Letter from Commodore Porter to Sec’y of the Navy (Nov. 19, 1823), in PORTER
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 214.
290.
SOFAER, supra note 288, at 372–73.
291.
Additional Naval Force for the Suppression of Piracy, in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 1050 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gale
& Seaton 1834). Congress also reiterated its two-pronged strategy of military violence and
criminal prosecution. See H. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, PIRACY AND OUTRAGE ON THE
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES BY SPANISH PRIVATEERS, H.R. REP. NO. 18-398 (2d
Sess. 1825), reprinted in 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253,
at 585 (noting that the United States was pursuing pirates in the Caribbean “by a vigorous exertion of the naval power” and “careful prosecution before competent tribunals of all the accused who were taken”).
292.
President James Monroe, Address to the Senate of the United States (Jan. 13,
1825), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 490.
293.
Piracy, N.Y. SPECTATOR, Apr. 19, 1825, at 3; see also Domestic, PORTLAND
ADVERTISER (Portland, Me.), Apr. 6, 1825, at 2 (noting that the U.S. Navy engaged pirates
off Puerto Rico and “5 of the pirates were killed”).
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294

caught by Spanish soldiers. Porter’s June 1825 orders to a subordinate
cruising off Cuba reveal a lack of concern with orderly legal process:
You will protect the honest and peaceable inhabitants, but whenever you find fishermen without their families, you will give them a
rigid examination, and if you find them without license and with
arms, you will destroy their establishment, and if there is good and
sufficient reasons to believe that they have been engaged in acts of
piracy, you will bring them off with you or deliver them to a Span295
ish civil or military officer.
As noted above, Porter was recalled later in 1825 after offending Spanish authorities in Puerto Rico. By then, his work was mostly complete.
There did continue to be some piracy and some U.S. naval actions in the
West Indies, but both were far less frequent. In 1828, suspected pirates fired
on U.S. naval vessels cruising the coast of Cuba. The Navy “discharged
several broadsides” and then landed on shore, burned “[a] small hamlet, the
pirates resided in,” and “many [pirates] were supposed to have been killed
296
from the fire of the [schooners] as well as from the men who landed.”
In sum, the Navy openly discussed exterminating pirates and destroying
private property, without any semblance of concern about due process
rights.

C. Views in Congress on the Extrajudicial Killing of Pirates
A number of congressional debates in the early nineteenth century reveal that many members of Congress agreed with the legal commentators
and the position evidenced by executive branch practice that pirates encountered on the high seas could be killed without judicial process. Chapman’s
sole piece of evidence that states directly—according to his reading of it—
that U.S. constitutional rights required trial at common law for any pirates
seized anywhere in the world by U.S. officials is a congressional document,
a March 1822 report of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Naval
297
Affairs. As discussed below, Chapman’s reading of the report is almost
certainly erroneous.

1. Acrimony about Andrew Jackson’s Seminole War
In 1818, General Andrew Jackson led a small army—made up of U.S.
regulars, volunteers from Tennessee, and friendly Native American Indians—into Spanish-owned Florida. Notwithstanding a state of peace with
Spain, Jackson was authorized to do this by the Monroe administration in

294.
295.
296.
297.

Official Papers, BERKSHIRE STAR (Stockbridge, Mass.), May 5, 1825, at 2.
PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 298.
Defeat of Pirates, E. FLA. HERALD (St. Augustine), Sept. 13, 1828.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 420–21, 437.
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order to punish hostile Seminole Indians and runaway slaves who were us298
ing Florida as a haven for cross-border attacks. Jackson quickly exceeded
his orders by attacking and ousting Spanish authorities and, after hunting
down his prey, ordering the execution of two British subjects who were al299
lied with the Seminoles. The executions came after highly irregular and
perfunctory military trials.
Jackson was a national figure of growing appeal. A partisan debate ensued in Congress about the propriety of his actions. Regarding the executions, Jackson justified himself by saying, among other things, “It is an established principle of the law of nations, that any individual of a nation,
making war against the citizens of another nation, they being at peace, for300
feits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and a pirate.” Jackson also
contended that domestic U.S. law had nothing to say about the legality of
301
the executions because they occurred in foreign territory.
Congressional responses to his claims reveal something about attitudes
toward execution of pirates encountered on the high seas. A report of the
House Committee on Military Affairs did not deny that pirates might be
summarily executed, but denied that the two British subjects should be con302
sidered to have the status of pirates. A report of a Select Senate Commit303
tee did the same. Henry Clay of Kentucky made ambiguous remarks in
the House that perhaps asserted that the British subjects were denied constitutional rights; Clay unambiguously declared that if the men were pirates
they “should have been turned over to the civil authority,” and that execu304
tion could only follow condemnation in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Jackson’s supporters disagreed. Henry Baldwin of Pennsylvania, later appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, denied that the Constitution applied outside U.S. borders and sustained the legality of the executions, stating that
the men were pirates and outlaws and thus “placed beyond the protection of
305
civilized society.” Representative Johnson of Kentucky argued that, “by
analogy,” the British men “may be treated as pirates, and put to the
306
sword.” Alexander Smyth of Virginia contended that “banditti” and pirates could be lawfully killed, and that these men were properly treated as

298.
See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 531–32.
299.
Id. at 532.
300.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 516–17 (1819).
301.
34 ANNALS OF CONG. 2308, 2319 (1819) (Memorial from Major General Andrew
Jackson to the Senate).
302.
32 ANNALS OF CONG. 517 (1819).
303.
Id. at 267.
304.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 641–45. On the ambiguity in Clay’s comments and the reporting of them, see Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 533.
305.
Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 526; 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1042–44
(1819).
306.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 655 (1819).
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307

such. He also disagreed with Clay on extraterritoriality, asserting that the
308
U.S. Constitution and laws were not in force in Spanish Florida. George
Strother and Philip Pendleton Barbour, both of Virginia, agreed that U.S.
309
domestic law did not govern these events in foreign territory.

2. Debates about Caribbean Piracy
In December 1822, Representative Lewis Condict of New Jersey introduced a resolution asking that the Committee on Naval Affairs investigate
and report on what measures are necessary “not only for the more efficient
protection of our commerce in the West India seas from piracy, but for the
entire extirpation of those freebooters, and the punishment of those who
310
may be found to aid and abet them.” Condict stated:
I have no idea of incurring the delay, or the hazard, of transporting
them here, or of extending them a trial by jury, with all the delays
incident to our courts of justice. They have placed themselves beyond the protection of the laws of civilized society; they have set at
open defiance the laws of God and man; their hand is against every
man, and every man’s hand should combine against them. And the
most effectual restraint which you can impose upon their barbarities, is to furnish to them the spectacle of a few dozen of their leaders suspending by the halter, from the yard-arms of some of our
311
public ships.
A bill was pending to authorize the president to purchase or construct
vessels “for the purpose of repressing piracy, and of affording effectual protection to the citizens and commerce of the United States in the Gulf of
312
Mexico, and the seas and territories adjacent.” Representative Taylor of
New York wanted that bill to pass immediately so the executive could
“promptly organize a force adequate to their [the pirates’] total extermina313
tion.” Alexander Smyth of Virginia then introduced an amendment “[t]hat
the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and required, to pursue the pirates by land on any of the West India islands to which they may resort, as
314
well as on the ocean, until they are exterminated.” This proposal implies,
of course, that military extermination of pirates is lawful.

307.
Id. at 684–86.
308.
Id. at 692–94; 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 693 (1819).
309.
33 ANNALS OF CONG. 845–46 (statements of Rep. Strother); 32 ANNALS OF CONG.
778 (1819) (statements of Rep. Barbour).
310.
40 ANNALS OF CONG. 348 (1822).
311.
Id.
312.
Id. at 371.
313.
Id. at 374.
314.
Id. at 377.
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Louis McLane of Delaware—a former Navy midshipman and now
chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs—objected to the proposed
amendment because, by the law of nations, no nation can enter another’s
territory to pursue pirates unless that nation was unable or unwilling to pre315
vent the piracies. This was a concern about state sovereignty, not individual rights. Churchill Cambreleng, a merchant from New York and another
Naval Committee member, opposed the amendment because he hoped the
executive would pursue pirates across any “imaginary line” marking Spanish territory and thought that Congress should be willing to accept war if
316
that was what resulted from necessary U.S. actions against pirates. Thus,
Cambreleng supported a military extermination of pirates.
Additional evidence of his lack of belief that the Due Process Clause
required that all pirates be handled through a domestic criminal justice process is found in Cambreleng’s subsequent statement. He declared that he
supported the pending bill to use the military because, when pirates have
previously been captured, “they make their escape from a just fate through
317
the sinuosities of the law.” Philip Pendleton Barbour of Virginia, recently
elected to be the Speaker of the House, spoke up to oppose the Smyth
amendment because of concerns about violations of the law of nations if
Congress authorized its naval forces to enter another country’s territory. He
also referenced concerns about interfering with the president’s discretion to
318
act as Commander-in-Chief. The Speaker saw no legal impediment to extralegal summary punishment of pirates:
With regard to the idea of pirates being the enemies of human race,
there could be no doubt of it, and on the great highway of nations
[the high seas] we have a right to take them and deal with them as
we please. But it was another question how far we have a right to
319
pursue them on the territory of another and a friendly Power.
No one is recorded expressing disagreement with the legal views of
Johnston, Condict, Smyth, Cambreleng, or Barbour about military extermination of pirates. After three other representatives expressed concerns about
the Smyth amendment on Spanish sovereignty grounds and two representatives suggested that an important bill to bolster the naval force against piracy should not be sidelined because of debatable questions about the law of
320
nations, Smyth withdrew his amendment and the bill passed.

315.
Id. at 377–78; see generally BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS 1774–
PRESENT, http://bioguide.congress.gov (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (providing biographies of
members of Congress).
316.
40 ANNALS OF CONG. 379 (1822).
317.
Id.
318.
Id. at 380.
319.
Id.
320.
Id. at 382–84.
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In a brief Senate discussion, Senator James Barbour, brother of the
Speaker of the House, referenced the House debates and stated that the
United States can pursue pirates into a neutral country, and that all nations
would “rejoice” in the “extermination” of pirates, who “deserved death at
every man’s hand, and whom it was just and proper to exterminate
321
wheresoever they could be found.” As in the House, there was no disagreement with this legal position.

3. The Report of the House Committee on Naval Affairs
Chapman’s sole piece of evidence—according to his reading of it—that
states directly that U.S. constitutional rights required trial at common law
for any pirates seized anywhere in the world by U.S. officials is a March
1822 report of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Naval Af322
fairs. This is the relevant section of the report, which was issued a few
months before the House debate recounted above:
The committee are also of the opinion that it would be inexpedient
‘to authorize the destruction of persons and vessels found at sea, or
in uninhabited places, making war upon the commerce of the United States without any regular commission,’ and that it would be inconsistent with public law or general usage to give any authority to
destroy pirates and piratical vessels found at sea or in uninhabited
places. The committee are of the opinion that it would be dangerous, and productive of great evil, to vest in the commanders of our
public vessels an authority to treat as pirates, and punish without
trial, even such persons as above described. It is not necessary for
the accomplishment of the object in view that such an authority
should be given, and it is essentially due to the rights of all, and the
principles of ‘public law and general usage,’ that the consequences
and punishment of piracy should follow only a legal adjudication of
323
the fact.
The reasons given by the Committee for recommending against such
legislation sound primarily in policy, not law: “inexpedient,” “not necessary,” and, “dangerous.” But Chapman reads the document as expressing
the view that law and, specifically, due process of law under the Constitution, required that any alleged pirate confronted by U.S. officials be tried
324
according to ordinary domestic law enforcement procedures. He concedes
that “general usage” “almost certainly referred exclusively to the practices

321.
Id. at 34.
322.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 420–21, 437.
323.
Additional Number of Small Vessels to be Employed for the Suppression of Piracy:
Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Naval Affairs, 17th Cong., 1st Sess. (1822), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note 291, at 787, 788.
324.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 420–21, 437.
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of other nations,” but asserts that the term “public law” “could have been
325
understood” to mean the Constitution. Chapman also states, “[i]t is unclear where the request originated, but it may well have been the Executive
326
Department.”
The request originated with Representative Josiah Stoddard Johnston of
Louisiana, a lawyer and judge who represented a state containing a significant port (New Orleans), which handled a large oceanic trade. In February
1822, Johnston introduced a motioned that:
[T]he Committee on Naval Affairs were instructed to inquire into
the expediency of employing a greater number of public vessels in
the suppression of the piracies carried on against the commerce of
the United States, and whether it is necessary to employ, arm, and
equip, private vessels for this purpose, and how many, and in what
manner; and to report, generally, the measures deemed necessary to
give entire and effectual protection to the persons and property of
the citizens of the United States in the West Indies and Gulf of
Mexico; and to inquire how far it may be expedient to authorize the
destruction of persons and vessels found at sea, or in uninhabited
places, making war upon the commerce of the United States without any regular commission; and how far, consistent with public
law, a general usage or authority may be given to destroy pirates
327
and piratical vessels found at sea or in uninhabited places.
By suggesting that whether to adopt this policy was a matter of expediency and, as we shall see, perhaps international law, Johnston was taking an
implicit legal position that the Constitution did not prohibit summary, extrajudicial killing of suspected pirates and destruction of their property.
The Committee that took up his resolution and prepared the report
quoted above was chaired by Louis McLane, the lawyer and former Navy
328
man. Other committee members also had experience with law and maritime matters, including Timothy Fuller, a Martha’s Vineyard lawyer; Benjamin Hardin, a Kentucky lawyer who frequently appeared before the U.S.
Supreme Court; George Gilmer, a Georgia lawyer; and Cambreleng, the
329
New York merchant.
In speaking of piracy on the high seas in the context of relations with
Spain and its former colonies, now claiming to be independent states, what
would men learned in law, government, and maritime affairs mean by the
terms “public law and general usage”? There can be little doubt that the

325.
Id. at 420.
326.
Id.
327.
38 ANNALS OF CONG. 911 (1822).
328.
Id. at 1014–15.
329.
See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S.
bioguide.congress.gov (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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committee was referring to international law. Only a few years before the
Committee on Naval Affairs wrote its report, Justice Joseph Story, a maritime law expert, wrote the opinion in a major Supreme Court decision concerning piracy called United States v. Smith. There, Story wrote that the
rules of the law of nations concerning piracy “may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by
330
the general usage and practice of nations[.]” House committee members
would almost certainly have been familiar with this decision.
As noted, Chapman does concede that “general usage” in the context of
the committee report must refer to the practices of nations. In the context of
this House document, “public law,” especially when referenced together
with the practices of nations, clearly refers to international law. In addition
to Smith, numerous contemporaneous federal court decisions, important legal treatises and pamphlets, and debates in Congress can be cited to show
that “public law” meant international law when used, as here, in the context
331
of maritime affairs and/or relations with other nations.
In case this evidence of linguistic usage is not enough to persuade, the
nearly-contemporaneous congressional debate about piracy recounted
332
above shows that members of the Naval Committee and other members of
Congress suggested without dissent that extrajudicial killing of pirates was
lawful.
Insofar as the Committee report referenced law in addition to the primary concerns about policy and expediency, it was referring to international
law. Chapman rejects that reading of the report because, he writes, “[i]t is
doubtful” that the law of nations guaranteed legal adjudication for persons

330.
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820) (emphasis added).
331.
See, e.g., Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145–46 (1812);
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 418–19 (1815); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7
Wheat.) 283, 348–49 (1822); La Nereyda, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 108, 141, 148–49, 154–55
(1823); The Gran Para, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 471, 484 (1822); The Fortuna, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.)
161, 166 (1817); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 103 (1825); The Julia, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 181, 189 (1814); United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551); Johnson v. Twenty-One Bales, 13 F. Cas. 855, 860–61, 863
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1814) (No. 7,417); The Francis, 9 F. Cas. 673, 673–74 (C.C.D.R.I. 1813) (No.
5,034), aff’d, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 363 (1814); United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 656
(C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 15,494); 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 643, 655–57, 669, 746–48, 769, 779,
898, 939, 962–63, 971, 1093 (including statements on “public law” by Reps. Clay, Johnson,
Barbour, Storrs, Mercer, Anderson, Poindexter, and Desha); CORNELIUS VAN
BYNKERSHOEK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAR, at vi, 70, 175 (Peter Stephen Du Ponceau
trans., Philadelphia, Farrand & Nicholas 1810); HENRY WHEATON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF
MARITIME CAPTURES AND PRIZES, at iii, vii, 54, 94, 96, 171, 209, 214, 260 (New York,
M’Dermut & D.D. Arden 1815); KENT, supra note 244, at 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 21, 38,
39, 71, 78, 115, 144, 175, 182, 194; JAMES MADISON, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BRITISH
DOCTRINE, WHICH SUBJECTS TO CAPTURE A NEUTRAL TRADE, NOT OPEN IN TIME OF PEACE
27, 46, 47, 85, 104 n.†, 154, 188 (Philadelphia, 1805).
332.
See infra Section VI.C.2.
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333

captured abroad suspected of piracy. But Chapman is ignoring an important part of international law—treaties.
Recall that the context in which the Committee report was written was
how to address pirates based on Spanish islands, primarily Cuba and Puerto
Rico. And the United States had recently, in 1819, reaffirmed the core pro334
visions of a 1795 treaty with Spain. One of the reaffirmed 1795 provisions
stated:
[T]hat the Subjects or Citizens of each of the contracting Parties,
their Vessels, or effects shall not be liable to . . . detention on the
part of the other for any military expedition or other public or private purpose whatever; and in all cases of seizure, detention, or arrest for . . . offences commited by any Citizen or Subject of the one
Party within the jurisdiction of the other, the same shall be made
and prosecuted by order and authority of law only, and according to
335
the regular course of proceedings usual in such cases.
The reaffirmed treaty also provided:
[T]hat the inhabitants of the territories of each Party shall respectively have free access to the Courts of Justice of the other, and
they shall be permitted to prosecute suits for the recovery of their
properties . . . and for obtaining satisfaction for the damages which
336
they may have sustained.
These treaty provisions were an important part of the “public law” that governed relations between Spain and the United States at the time. Whether or
not a strict reading of their terms makes them applicable to seizures of pi337
rates of Spanish nationality on the high seas, the Committee would certainly have been aware that Spanish-United States relations on these matters
were fraught and that erring on the side of legal process was good policy.
In addition, the United States promised Spain in the 1795 treaty, and reaffirmed in 1819, that it would criminally “punish[ ] as a Pirate” any Spanish subject or U.S. citizen who sailed under a letter of marque or other
338
commerce-raiding commission of a country at war with Spain. As noted

333.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 420; see also Chapman, supra note 15, at 434–36 (further arguing that the law of nations did not require any particular municipal arrangement for
trying piracy, such as a jury trial).
334.
Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, supra note 260. (“The treaty of limits and
navigation, of 1795, remains confirmed in all and each one of its articles excepting the 2, 3, 4,
21, and the second clause of the 22d article.”). The treaty went into effect in early 1821.
335.
Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, art. 7, Oct. 27, 1795, 8
Stat. 138.
336.
Id. art. 20.
337.
I think it is possible that the first quoted provision would not be, but the second
would.
338.
Id. art. 14.
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above, many of the pirates in the Caribbean tried to legally justify their activities by means of real or feigned privateering commissions from breakaway Spanish colonies that were fighting for their independence. This third
provision supplies yet another reason why the House Committee might
write that the “public law” governing its relations with Spain concerning piracy should prioritize the use of law enforcement methods over brute force.
Other international law binding on the United States also counseled in
favor of law enforcement methods when dealing with suspected pirates in
the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. France and Great Britain both had many
colonial possessions in that area, where the United States was acting against
pirates, and thus had many subjects who made a living on the seas there, either legally or illegally. Bilateral treaties between the United States, on the
one hand, and both Britain and France on the other, promised that each
country would refuse to harbor or aid any pirates and would bring pirates to
339
“condign punishment,” almost certainly referring to a criminal convic340
tion. Only by ignoring these treaties can it be said that the House Committee on Naval Affairs had no reason to suggest that “public law” favored law
enforcement methods rather than summary execution of pirates captured in
the West Indies.

***
Americans operating under their new Constitution continued to follow
the essentials of English law and practice with regard to piracy. Criminal
trials were used frequently for captured pirates. But the government also
frequently engaged in extrajudicial killing of pirates, as well as destruction
of their property. Members of Congress expressly argued that this was lawful. The only evidence Chapman presents suggesting directly that the Constitution required law enforcement methods for any pirates encountered anywhere in the world—the 1822 House committee report—is best read as
saying no such thing.

IV. The War-Law Enforcement Divide
An enduring problem—one that is particularly acute with the United
States’ post-9/11 responses to international terrorism—is to distinguish situations in which the government may lawfully use military force against le-

339.
Convention of 1800, U.S.-Fr., art. 26, Sept. 30, 1800, 8 Stat 178; see Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 20, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116 [hereinafter
Jay Treaty].
340.
This provision was present in another U.S. treaty, in a context in which it is clear
that criminal punishment is meant. Jay Treaty, supra note 339 (“[T]he said Contracting Parties, shall not only refuse to receive any Pirates into any of their Ports, Havens, or Towns, or
permit any of their inhabitants to receive, protect, harbour, conceal or assist them in any manner, but will bring to condign punishment all such Inhabitants as shall be guilty of such acts or
offences.”).
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thal non-state actors, instead of the default methods of ordinary law enforcement. The polar cases are clear. In state-to-state armed conflict, military force can lawfully be used and enemy combatants lack individual rights
under domestic law, such as the Constitution. To address ordinary domestic
crime committed by single persons or small groups, the criminal justice approach, with its attendant procedural protections, is mandatory. Piracy,
which, like international terrorism, threatens mass-casualty attacks, transcends these neat polar categories and hence requires difficult line-drawing.
The legal stakes are high: full due process or none.
Chapman, by contrast, seems to view the line-drawing problem as relatively straightforward. “[W]ar was an exceptional legal state. Americans
understood that enemies were different than those suspected of violating
341
municipal (i.e., domestic) law.” And further: “Americans understood all
those suspected of violating U.S. law—anywhere—to be entitled to due
342
process of law.” In other words, if individuals or groups of individuals
were “suspected” of engaging in conduct that violated U.S. criminal or civil
laws, then only the ordinary means of law enforcement, comporting with
ordinary constitutional norms, could be used in response. And Chapman
claims that the U.S. government and other actors “consistently distinguished” between law enforcement settings in which due process was appli343
cable and “war,” but provides no examples that expressly show this supposed distinction being made.
In fact, this supposedly bright-line rule was never the law in the United
States. Within the United States, the constitutional tradition has always been
to zealously guard citizens from military force. Fear of standing armies that
would oppress the citizenry was one of the Anti-Federalists’ most potent ar344
guments against the proposed constitution. But some types of lawbreaking and violence were too widespread and powerful to be handled
solely by courts, juries, law enforcement, and due process. And outside the
country, the clear lines that Chapman sees in domestic law have always
been blurry, allowing the government great leeway to choose how it will respond to security threats.
The Constitution authorizes the suspension of habeas corpus—the suspension of judicial due process—”when in cases of rebellion or invasion the

341.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 383.
342.
Id. at 389.
343.
Id. at 413, 426–27.
344.
See, e.g., 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 164 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)
(statement by Pennsylvania minority) (“A standing army . . . may be made a fatal instrument
to overturn the public liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of the most oppressive taxes, and to carry into execution the most arbitrary measures. An ambitious man
who may have the army at his devotion, may step up into the throne, and seize upon absolute
power.”); 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 375 (Brutus II, New York Journal, Nov. 1,
1787) (“[A]s standing armies in time of peace are dangerous, they are not to be kept up.”).
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345

public safety may require it.” Likewise, the Constitution allows Congress
to call forth the militia “to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrec346
tions and repel invasions.” But these authorizations and limitations appear
by their text to apply only domestically—insurrections, rebellions, and inva347
sions are events that happen within a country, not outside of it. The Constitution did not provide protections against martial law outside the United
States.
When widespread resistance to U.S. laws occurred within the country,
Congress had already carefully hemmed in the president’s ability to respond
with military force. The 1792 Militia Act (or Calling Forth Act), followed
scrupulously by President Washington to put down the Whiskey Rebellion
of 1794, required that: the state where the armed resistance was occurring
petition for federal assistance; a federal judge certify that “the laws of the
United States [had been] opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in
any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by
this act;” and the president, “by proclamation, “ “command such insurgents
to disperse, and retire peaceably to their respective abodes, within a limited
348
time.” Even so, ordinary military could not be used, only militia from the
state where the disturbance was occurring, unless other formalities were
349
met. These extensive safeguards were required domestically—the act ap350
plied only in “any state” —before the U.S. executive could move to a military or “war” paradigm to address mass law-breaking. That domestic restriction on the reach of the statute was not accidental, but rather reflective
of the view that fundamental rights restricted the U.S. government domestically when proceeding against people who were wholly or primarily citizens.
There was no corresponding statutory framework, or even informal tradition, with similar safeguards for extraterritorial uses of the military against

345.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
346.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
347.
See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 522–23. But see Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the Habeas Suspension Clause “has full effect”
at a U.S. military base in territory permanently leased from Cuba).
348.
Militia Act of 1792, ch. 23, §§ 1–3, 1 Stat. 264. (amended 1795). As I and a coauthor have elsewhere written, “[t]he intricacy of these checks was no accident. The proposal
to allow the president to call out the militia to execute federal law was controversial and much
debated. It passed only after the initial bill was amended to add precisely the procedural
checks that [President] Washington later followed so carefully.” Andrew Kent & Julian Davis
Mortenson, Executive Power and National Security Power, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 261, 265 n.13 (Karen Orren & John W. Compton
eds., 2018).
349.
Militia Act of 1792, ch. 23, § 2, 1 Stat. 264. (amended 1795).
350.
Id. When the 1792 Act expired via its sunset provision, Congress re-enacted it in
essentially the same form in 1795. See Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424. (amended
1862).
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groups that violated U.S. laws. Instead, American law and policy adopted a
hybrid approach: both criminal justice measures and military force could be
used against dangerous non-state actors, where considered appropriate by
the executive, assuming that Congress authorized use of military force covered by its prerogative to declare war.
The Articles of Confederation evidence the hybridity of piracy and the
flexibility the government had in determining how to respond. On the one
hand, the Articles gave the central government the power of “appointing
351
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas.”
On the other, the Articles distinctly contemplated military force being used
to suppress piracy, in the provision barring states from commissioning “any
ships or vessels of war,” except if war is waged under the authority of the
central government or “unless such State be infested by pirates, in which
352
case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion.” The fact that pirates could be treated as military enemies is apparent in the frequently re353
peated tropes that pirates declared “war” against all mankind and were
354
“hostis humani generi,” that is, military enemies of all mankind.
We can see evidence of hybridity in the United States’ response to the
“piratical establishment” at Amelia Island in Spanish Florida, discussed
355
above. As noted above, the executive and Congress both announced that
the gang there was engaged in violations of U.S. law, such as the laws
356
against piracy and the international slave trade. For Chapman, this should
mean that only law enforcement measures, consistent with constitutional
due process, could be used. But the executive authorized a naval attack and,
as noted above, no one was heard to complain that that was illegal.
Chapman responds that the Amelia Island incident is not evidence
357
against his thesis because the armed group there was “quasi-sovereign.”
Thus, “[f]rom the United States’ standpoint, the enterprise amounted to an
exercise of war power because it entailed military action against a group

351.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
352.
Id. art. VI, para. 5.
353.
See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *71 (stating that the pirate “has reduced
himself afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind”);
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS supra note 137, at 797 (John Jay, Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, stating “Piracy is War against all mankind, which is the highest Violation of
the Laws of Nations.”).
354.
See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *71 (quoting Coke).
355.
See supra notes 253–259 and accompanying text.
356.
H.R. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUPPRESSION OF PIRATICAL
ESTABLISHMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 15-290 (1st Sess. 1818), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 132, 133; Message from President James
Monroe to Congress (December 2, 1817), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 130; Message from President James Monroe to Congress
(January 13, 1818), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at
139.
357.
Chapman, supra note 15, at 428.
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358

with political pretensions.” He does not explain why an unrealistic—
actually absurd—pretension to international sovereignty on behalf of a
small group of pirates and smugglers should determine the constitutionality
of the United States’ responses to them. In any event, both President Monroe and Congress agreed that the criminals at Amelia Island were non-state
359
actors, yet nevertheless viewed naval attack on them as lawful.
Were this an isolated instance of the use of military force against nonstate actors who violated U.S. criminal laws, we might dismiss it as exceptional. But in fact, the whole course of the U.S. government response to piracy in the Caribbean evidences the view that the government had the option
of using either or both law enforcement and military force when confronting
360
hybrid threats, outside a state of formal war. Thus, I have no found support in the historical record concerning piracy for Chapman’s claim that due
process was understood to limit the United States to using judicial process
and law enforcement methods to deal with all nonstate actors who violated
U.S. criminal laws.

Conclusion
The great weight of the evidence refutes the claim that either English or
early American law viewed due process in the sense claimed by Chapman.
But this fact proves far less than some might fear. Although the law allowed
the use of military force and summary executions against pirates, AngloAmerican practice was to use the criminal justice system extensively to try
pirates captured on the high seas, according them full due process when doing so. This preference for due process in many circumstances was driven
by a mix of factors, including concerns sounding in domestic policy, international relations, fairness to the accused, and the desire to leave open the
possibility of mercy. International law also granted rights to persons encountered by the U.S. and English governments on the high seas. So the
choice should not be viewed as a stark one, between the global extension of
due process and barbarism. The preference for criminal process was always
present, but may well have grown over time. This could be evidence of the
gradual development of a kind of due process-consciousness, even with regard to persons outside national borders accused of heinous crimes. But I
have found essentially no evidence for Chapman’s much stronger claim for
an established understanding of global due process, first under the English
common law and then under the original understanding of the U.S. Constitution.

358.
Id. (emphasis added).
359.
See Message from President James Monroe to Congress (Jan. 13, 1818), in
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 139; 31 ANNALS OF
CONG. 646–48 (1818).
360.
See supra Section IV.B.
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Judicial oversight of extraterritorial security and foreign affairs actions
via application of fundamental domestic law is not the only way to protect
against abuse. In fact, until very recently, it played almost no role in either
the British/English or U.S. traditions. Perhaps change is desirable; perhaps
the U.S. Constitution should go global to protect noncitizens, even in hybrid, war-like contexts such as terrorism and piracy. But if that occurs, it
should be because judges have accurately understood our legal history and
decided affirmatively that change is desirable. Arguments for such a change
in U.S. law should address whether extending constitutional protections
would be consistent with the legitimate security needs of the United States,
as well as with evolving norms of international and constitutional rights in
related contexts. This contextual, incremental, policy-sensitive approach to
developing legal change would be, in my view, preferable to sweeping
originalist arguments that have little basis in our history, institutional practices, and legal traditions.

